



An Asian Barometer Writing Workshop on

Why Asians Support Democracy and Why Not?

Session I. Does Culture Matter?

Analyzing the Foundation for the Economic Priority in East Asia

By

Alex Chang

Academia Sinica

Yun-han Chu

Yu-tzung Chang

National Taiwan University

Analyzing the Foundation for the Economic Priority in East Asia

Alex Chang

Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica
chang626@gate.sinica.edu.tw

Yun-han Chu

Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica
yunhan@gate.sinica.edu.tw

Yu-tzung Chang

Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
yutzung@ntu.edu.tw

*Paper prepared for delivery at an Asian Barometer Writing Working on “Why Asians Support Democracy and Why Not?” organized by *Asian Barometer Survey*, National Taiwan University, June 22-23, 2008, Taipei, Taiwan.

** This is only a draft. Please do not quote without authors' written permission **

I. Introduction

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in the 1948, that provided for the basic dignity and protection for human beings, human right activists and political scientists have been trying to construct universalist theories of human rights and to assign fundamental obligations for UN member states to follow (UDHR Article 1; Donnelly 1986, and 1989; 49-50). Nevertheless, these tough tasks have ignited serious debate between the West and the East.

The universal criteria of human rights are generally considered as the product of Western history (Vincent 1986, 19-36). Inherited from Locke, the UDHR emphasizes individual dignity, equality, and freedom. To protect the basis of human rights, it further sets up restrictions on government, groups, and intervention (UDHR Article 30). However, most Asian leaders do not appreciate the universal definition of human rights and its application.¹ They assert that the power of defining human rights should not be monopolized by the West and that individual freedom should not be considered as a supreme principle. Instead, it should be determined by culture and associated social identity (Eldridge 2002; 15). They claim that domestic knowledge is the prerequisite for installing human rights in Asian states and the installation of human rights without understanding Asian values would be considered as a Western invasion (See Bell 2000, 44-46; Zakaria 1994).²

This paper analyzes the conflicts between Western and Eastern values. There are three core questions: First, *what are the fundamental differences between the two sets of values?* To address this question, we focus on four major aspects: the content of human rights, the philosophical background of human rights, the prioritizing of economic development and democracy, and the criteria of evaluation. Among these major aspects, we assert that the priority of economic

¹ For example, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been openly argued that the liberalism and Western-style democracy does not appropriate to Singapore and Asian states several times. See Sam Demo's interview with Lee in Bell 2000, Ch3. See also Fareed Zakaria's interview with Lee in Foreign Affairs Vol. 73 (2). Before the ASEAN meeting in 1997, Mahathir bin Mohamad also made a speech condemning the UDHR, accusing the US and other countries of trying to impose their values on Asians.

² Some Asian leaders even assert that the human right is the alibi for the US and Western states' demands on opening markets that have been protected and well-regulated by Asian governments (Kausikan 1993, 27). For example, Mahathir argued that the US campaigns for workers' right in Asia in order to undermine the competitiveness of Asian companies and to maintain its regional dominance (See International Herald Tribune, 17 May 1994).

development over democracy is the major difference between the West and the East. Empirical evidence shows that in East Asia, economic development apparently outweighs democracy.

This finding thus leads to the second question: *Why do Asians stress economic development over democracy?* To answer this question, we theorize the social and cultural backgrounds for Eastern values and argue that Asian soft authoritarianism is based on social consent and is endorsed by traditionalism and authoritarianism in Asian society. To support our arguments, we incorporate the cross-national datasets from the first and the second wave Asian Barometer Survey with a three-level structural equation model.

The cross-national analysis provides a practicable suggestion for solving the third question: *How to install liberal democratic values into Asian society?* We argue that economic development and democracy should not be mutually exclusive. Disentangling traditionalism from authoritarianism and providing traditionalism with democratic meanings could help install democratic values into Asian society. The empirical analysis also reveals an interesting finding: contrary to what modernization theory predicts (Lipset 1959, 1994), economic development does not necessarily drive Asians to support democratization. Instead, it further pushes them to prioritize economic development and strengthens the legitimacy of Asian authoritarian regimes.

II. The Fundamental Differences between the West and the East

Negative vs. Positive Rights

The first difference between Western and Eastern values is the nature of human rights. Based on the tradition inherited from social contract theory, Western tradition emphasizes civil and political rights of individuals (Plant 1993). To maximize individual rights and to prevent members from violating others' freedom, liberalists argue that statutory restraints are required for states. Since this idea concerns formal restriction on states and asks individuals' forbearance, the civil and political rights Western traditions concern are considered as negative rights (Cranston

1973, 1983; Evans 2002; 200). In contrast with negative civil and political rights emphasized by the West, Eastern values are more concerned about members' substantial economic and social demands and stresses positively providing material means of life to all members in states (Plant 1993).

Conflicts between negative and positive rights are ignited between the West and the East. Advocators of negative rights oppose positive claims as human rights due to three arguments: First, they assert that human rights should be guaranteed without exception to all human beings. While negative claims are almost costless and all states are capable of fulfilling them, positive claims stress social and economic rights and rely on states' capabilities. Moreover, even if states are all capable of providing substantial materials for their members, positive rights, unlike negative rights, lack clear standards. Lastly, unlike negative rights that explicitly indicate members' civil and political rights, positive rights are more like governments' social policies which do not explicitly specify the rights of human beings (Cranston 1973, 1983; Plant 1989). On the other hand, some authors claim that without fundamental rights, such as the right to live, security, and subsistence, civil and political rights are meaningless (Shue 1996, 39). The basic right to food, shelter and the conditions for good health are also combined with negative rights (Evans 2002, 203).

Universalism and Individualism vs. Relativism and Contextualism

The four freedoms - *Freedom of speech and expression*, *Freedom of religion*, *Freedom from want*, and *Freedom from fear* - declared by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 can represent the universal values of human rights. Western values consider human rights as inalienable, unconditional and fundamental freedoms that humans everywhere in the world ought to enjoy (Brown 1997, 42-43). The universality of human rights is viewed as the legacy of Western tradition of the natural law, which is a set of basic principles of behavior, basic requirements of practical reasonableness, and general moral standards for all human beings (Finnis 1980, 23). The

tradition of natural law was later reinterpreted by social contract theorists and combined with individualism (Hampton 1986, 6-10; Bobbio 1993; Gordon 1993). Social contract theory asserts that to avoid the chaos of the state of nature and to protect their own property and natural rights, individuals, explicitly or implicitly, surrender parts of their rights to form a community or a state, and that the state is responsible for protecting its members from any violations of human rights.

Unlike the West emphasizing individual rights, the East asserts that the definition of human rights is actually associated with particular social, cultural, and historical backgrounds (Brown 1997, 43; Bell 2000, 49).³ Eastern society, unlike its Western counterpart, believes that the individual exists in the context of his family (Bell 2000, 192; Hood 1998, 857-862; Tu 1996; 115-116; Harrison 1992, 143). A Chinese aphorism: *xiushen, qijia, zhiguo, and pingtianxia* (修身、齊家、治國、平天下), states that a well-governed state and an ideal world can be achieved via well-behaved individuals and harmonious families, clearly represents the contextual relations between individuals and states. Due to different historical backgrounds and insisting on cultural relativism, Asian leaders reject the intervention of Western democracies and the idea of universal human rights and assert that Asia must construct political regimes that suit its unique conditions (Hood 1998, 853).

Democracy vs. Economic Development

The third conflict between the West and East is the prioritizing of economic development and democracy. The UN Declaration on the Right to Development (RTD) elaborates the Western view on the priority best. Even though the RTD acknowledges that states have rights and also the duty to formulate national development plans and to enhance the welfare of all their people, Article 2(1) asserts that the human being is the central subject of development and its preamble emphasizes that “the promotion of, respect for, and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental

³ Critics also find that contextualism is not monopolized by the East. Hegel’s “ethnic community” and Marx’s “class consciousness” can both be considered as instances of Western contextualism. See Brown 1997, 49-50; Vincent 1986, 19-36.

freedoms.” In other words, in the Western society, liberal democracy and human rights still outweigh economic development. In contrast with the RTD and the Western view, Asian leaders assert that economic development is prior to civil and political liberties and justify their violations of human rights by appealing to national security and higher imperatives of economic development (Donnelly 1999, 610). Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew declares that political liberties need to be sacrificed to secure more basic material demands (Bell 2000, 219-232).

Procedure vs. Consequence

Western society considers procedures as the most essential institutional factor protecting human life, liberty, and property (Griffin 2001, 318). In a court of law, rules of mandatory procedure for transparency ensure the open presentation of evidence and pleadings on sentencing. Plaintiffs and defendants are held equal before the law and are provided with ample opportunity to articulate their claims, to present evidence, and to defend their own interests (Henham 2004). Procedural justice not only protects human rights via judiciary, but also represents the institutionalization of a political system. By following institutionalized regulations, people can comprehend and anticipate the outcomes of their behavior, and further exercise their rationality to avoid violation of statutory regulations and punishment by the government.

Unlike Western society stressing procedural justice, Eastern society is more concerned the consequences of their policies and government performance. They assert that democratic procedures have no moral status and intrinsic value, “Good government is about results, not process[es]”⁴ and procedures are evaluated by their consequences (Arneson 1993, 125). The choice among various possible governance regimes is to be made by selecting the regime whose implementation would maximize the attainment of moral goals (Arneson 2003, 124). In short, democracy is only one of all possible instruments available and does not necessarily yield the

⁴ By Lee Kuan Yew. See Bell 2000, 185.


best outcome. Society should be capable of selecting a decision procedure that is likely to produce the greatest fulfillment of people's significant moral rights over time (Arneson 2003, 131).

The discussion above enables us to derive the difference between the West and the East. In contrast with the West, the East focuses more on contextual relations of individuals in a society instead of their independence and civil and political rights. Based on contextualism and relativism, economic development and satisfaction of substantive material demands not only become the formal reason for Asian leaders to limit civil and political rights, to postpone democratization, and to justify their soft authoritarianism, but also the goals of government and the criterion of evaluating government performance.


Asian Barometer Survey further empirically supports the findings above and shows that a majority of interviewees agree that economic development is more important than democracy (See Figure 1 and Figure 2).⁵ Why do Asian people prioritize economic development over democratization? Appropriately answering this question not only helps us acquire domestic knowledge and understand social support and legitimacy of Asian soft authoritarianism, but also enable us to find a route for installing democracy in Asian countries without conflicting with vested interests. Thus, in the following section we discuss the historical, cultural, and social-economic backgrounds of Eastern values.

⁵ Xing Bao also reported that 71.4% Hong Kong citizens opted for economic prosperity instead of democracy. See Xing Bao 19 October 1993.

Econ. Development vs. Democracy (First Wave)



Econ Development vs. Democracy (Second Wave)



III. Asian Values and Its Foundation

Traditionalism and Confucianism

A Chinese aphorism can represent the key value underpinning East Asian traditions: *Da dao zhi xing ye, tian xia wei gong* (大道之行也，天下爲公). It means that if everyone can put aside

self-interest and consider more public interest, then all people can enjoy a better way of life. Here, public interest, which is similar to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's general will, indicates the maximum welfare of all people instead of the sum of individuals' interests. As mentioned in the section above, Confucianism teaches Asians that their welfare is associated with group welfare, and individuals are asked to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of general interests (Hood 1998, 854). The Confucian contextualism has been manipulated by Asian leaders and been socialized into people's daily life for millennia. For example, even children at four can easily recite the Chinese saying: *wo wei ren ren, ren ren wei wo* (我爲人人，人人爲我), which literally means that if I act for the good of others, then they will also act for my good.

Does Confucianism really benefit economic development? Even though Max Weber agrees that "Material well-being has never in any civilized land been so emphatically represented as the ultimate goal as it has been in China" (Weber 1984, 76, recited from Harrison 1992 ch.3), after comparing Confucianism with Calvinism, he asserts that personal relations are an obstacle to objective rationalization (Weber 1984, 76, recited from Harrison 1992 ch.3). In addition, the absence of an effective legal system, subjective and often irrational decisions by conservative emperors and mandarins further discourage investments (Weber 1984, 76-79, recited from Harrison 1992 ch.3). Nevertheless, rapid economic growth in Japan and the Four Mini Dragons provides counterevidence to Weber's hypotheses.

Then, how does traditionalism and Confucianism contribute to rapid economic development in Japan and the Four Mini Dragons? First, the installation of modern capitalism inevitably results in conflicts between self interests. Traditionalism and Confucianism, which emphasizes individuals' contextual relations with their communities, more or less averts these potential conflicts. In addition, unlike India, and Indonesia's central planning, the central planning in Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan lends to a market-oriented planned economy, an authoritarianism-capitalism nexus (Johnson 1994, 459). On the one hand, government intervention is required to set up developmental goals and to guide the domestic

economy and regulate corporations. On the other, the market mechanism is required to maintain competition, to provide profit incentives, and to stimulate productivity. However, during the procedure of economic materialization and development, economic policies, such as land reform, land expropriation, farm redistricting, and industrial transition, inevitably affect vested interests. By stressing public interests, Confucianism not only justifies government intervention in economic activities and resource distribution, but also provides a cushion for civil grievances against central planning, avoids potential conflicts between society and government, and reduces the extent to which the central government utilizes authority to enforce its policies.

Furthermore, Confucianism respects intellectuals and ranks them first among the four occupations: *shi, nong, gong, and shang* (士、農、工、商) (Harrison 1992, 83). Besides reminding them of the contextual relations between individuals and the community, Confucianism requires intellectuals to study the phenomena of nature in order to acquire knowledge and act with sincerity and integrity: *ge wu, zhi zhi, cheng yi, and zheng hsin* (格物、致知、誠意、正心). The Confucian tradition emphasizing education, not only encourages people to pursue higher education levels, but further charges Asian governments with the task of providing compulsory education (Bell 2000, 61, 186). In Japan and the Four Mini Dragons, education has received a high priority and the literacy rate and average education levels are comparable to those in advanced countries (Harrison 1992, 106). Government education policy and society's emphasis on education further provides high quality human capital and a labor force able to acquire relevant technological knowledge, raising productivity within the domestic economy (Romer 1993, 547; Pack 1992, 299; Collins and Bosworth 1996).

Asian tradition also accentuates the virtue of thrift and encourages people saving their earnings for future. “*you jian ru she yi, you she ru jian nan*” (由儉入奢易，由奢入儉難) reminds people of how difficult to cultivate the habit of thrift. The tradition of diligence and thrift encourages conservative Asians save money, especially in postal saving accounts. This thus makes postal saving systems in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan the most important

institutions created by governments to promote savings. Immense savings not only help government to counter against the adverse effects of hot money and capital flows, to manipulate exchange rates, and to control consumer prices in domestic markets, but also enable governments to increase public expenditure and investment and to provide low-interest business loans to key industries without risking financial deficits. Governments' efforts in running small deficits or large surpluses and maintaining sound macroeconomic policies has further contributed directly to high levels of national savings (Stiglitz and Uy 1996, 254).

IV. Authoritarianism and Patron-Client Relations⁶

Scholars of Asian studies generally recognize authoritarianism as the most important tradition in East Asian governance. Oi (1994) and Tu, Hejtmanek, and Wachman (1992) found that Asian subordinates tend to identify their interests with a group, to avoid internal division and conflict, and to better comply with commands from their leaders.

Two Chinese expressions reflect the Asian authoritative tradition. “*tian, di, jun, qin, shi*” (天地君親師), literally: God, earth, leaders, parents, and teachers, respectively, represents traditionally unchallengeable values. Asians are required to obey without question the five “idols.” In addition, “*ming ke shi you zhi, bu ke shi zhi zhi*” (民可使由之，不可使知之), which means that people only need to do whatever their leaders demand of them and that understanding what is asked of them is not necessary, indicates the traditional authoritarian pattern of Confucianism. Reischauer and Fairbank (1960, 30) find that the authoritarian pattern is very prevalent in Asian society and makes traditional Confucian society aristocratic, authoritarian, and static (Harrison 1992, 82).

Lucian Pye (1999) analyzes how Confucian civility that forms Asian society and claims that Confucian authoritarian pattern upholds high standards and ritual correctness within superior-subordinate relations. In such hierarchical relations, superiors can be likened to

⁶ Most students of Asian studies assert that authoritarianism is also included in Confucianism. In this section, we do not intend to oppose previous studies. To distinguish authoritarianism from other traditional values and to highlight its influence, we extract it from traditionalism and Confucianism.

patriarchs in families. They are assumed to possess greater knowledge and insight and are expected to take care of all subordinates, who are in return required to respect the authority of their superiors (Pye 1999, 768; Hood 1998, 856). In superior-subordinate relations, reciprocal acts and duties are performed and so they are also known as patron-client relations.

Weber argues that the Confucian superior was “in the self-perfection of his adaptation to the world an ultimate goal in himself”, instead of “a means to impersonal goals of any kind whatsoever”. Thus, in his opinion, Confucianism constitutes a rejection of economic training in the pursuit of profit (Weber 1984, 61, recited from Harrison 1992 ch.3). Nevertheless, Weber ignores the fact that the superior-subordinate (or patron-client) relation is not only based on subordinates’ absolute compliance, but on the mutual benefit of both parties. To uphold their own dignity, authority, and legitimacy, superiors have to consistently provide sufficient patronages to followers in exchange for their loyalty. To maximize their interests, subordinates, on the other hand, must comply completely with superiors’ commands and provide their loyalty and political and economic support (Hood 1998, 856). The patron-client relations not only bind superiors and subordinates, but also reduce uncertainty in economic activities and the cost on overseeing subordinates. Once economic development is defined as in the public interest by superiors, it easily prevails over all other values and becomes the doctrine of Asian society (Neher 1994, 958). This pattern thus becomes the fundamental model of Asian rapid economic development (Smart 1997).

In contrast with its contribution to Asian rapid economic development, Asian culture does not contribute to the legacy of democratic development. A strong state and unified government are considered as prerequisites of political stability, economic prosperity, and national security (Hood 1998, 856). In addition, democracy requires strong norms with regards to managing disagreements and social grievances. Nevertheless, in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the conventional norms show no tolerance toward political opposition and dissidents (Pye 1999,

768)⁷. Conflicts of ideas, groups, and parties were viewed as dangerous and illegitimate (Fukuyama 1995, 24-25) and the media only inform people of government policies, instead of questioning government decisions (Roy 1994, 234). Thus, Asian culture lends legitimacy to Asia's dominant political parties such as Japan's pre-1993 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Singapore's People's Action Party, and Taiwan's Kuomintang and justifies their soft authoritarianism.

V. Model Interpretation

Based on the discussions above, we argue that authoritarianism affects how Asians prioritize democracy and economic development and is the fundamental civility of Asian soft authoritarianism. It plays a mandatory role and shapes Asians' identification with their leaders. Authoritarianism not only asks Asians to comply absolutely with leadership, but also blames civil and political rights for destroying social cooperation and resulting in public unrest and general disorder. Under authoritarianism, disagreements, grievances, and political dissidence are deemed intolerable. For Asians, dissent is of concern and regarded as the origin of social turbulence. In terms of its influence on the prioritizing of economic and democratic developments, authoritarianism turns Asians away from bolstering democratic development. Thus, we can expect that interviewees' preference for authoritarianism or otherwise would also affect how they prioritize economic and democratic development. For people supporting authoritative tradition, they are more likely to reject democracy.

Confucianism and traditionalism, on the other hand, play a tutorial role and shape Asians' identification of their contextual relations with society and remind Asians of their personal interests connected with their communities. They convince Asians that their personal interests are tied with the fate of society and urge people to pursue long-term public interests instead of personal gains. In terms of traditionalism's influence on the prioritizing of economic and

⁷ Fukuyama also finds that Japanese culture does not fit well with public contestation and individualism (Fukuyama 1995, 22).

democratic development, it pushes Asians toward bolstering economic development. That is, for people identifying themselves more with society, it is reasonable to assume that they are more willing to surrender personal civil and political rights in order to enhance economic development and pursue public interests. Contrarily, for people recognizing themselves as independent individuals, they are less affected by traditionalism and place greater value on their own civil and political liberties as opposed to material demands.

It is also noteworthy that Confucianism and traditionalism also play a supplementary role for authoritarianism. For the sake of convenience, this paper extracts authoritarianism from traditionalism. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that Asian traditionalism provides the ideal breeding ground for authoritarian regimes. Asian leaders are accustomed to using contextual relations between individuals and society as an alibi to justify abolishing civil and political freedoms (Bell 2000). Thus, for people identifying with traditional values, it is reasonable to assume that they are more likely to commit themselves to authoritarianism.

Statistical Analysis and Model Selection

To empirically test the hypothesis above, we construct a structural equation model (See Figure 1) and further test it with cross-national data from an Asian Barometer Survey conducted in Japan, Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Taiwan in 2003 and 2007, respectively.

The dependent variable is how interviewees prioritize economic and democratic development. The survey asks respondents to reply to the question: *If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?* Interviewees can choose from four alternatives: *economic development is definitely more important*, *development is somewhat more important*, *democracy is somewhat more important*, and *democracy is definitely more important*. The alternative that *economic development and democracy are both equally important* is not revealed to interviewees. For convenience of analysis, we recode responses into three categories: *economic development is prior to democracy*,

democracy is prior to democracy, and economic development and democracy are both equally important. Since three categories cannot be ranked, we apply a multinomial logit model.

Figure 1 demonstrates the model of our assumptions. The main model suggests that respondents' prioritizing of economic development and democracy is a long-term tendency. We assume that the priority is directly affected by respondents' tendency toward authoritarianism and traditionalism. For those with authoritative tendencies and possessing traditional values, we assume that they are more likely to surrender their own civil and political rights and prioritize economic development. In addition, traditionalism plays a supplementary role supporting authoritarianism and indirectly affects how respondents evaluate the prioritizing of economic development and democracy. Those holding traditional values are more likely to support the authoritative values.

To clearly reveal how traditionalism and authoritarianism affect people's prioritizing of economic development and democracy, we further control respondents' satisfaction with government performance, which is affected by respondents' perceptions of corruption and the national economy, respondents' identification with the capability of democracy, and respondents' personal background, such as place of abode, level of education, age, and family income. Given the cross-national data structure of the 2002 and 2006 Asian Barometer Survey, to take into account the within-country and between-country effects, we apply a three-level structural equation model (SEM). To interpret the between-country effect, we employ several macro-level indicators, such as the GDP per capita, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita (Source: United Nations Statistics Division), Freedom House Index (Source: Freedom House), and the Corruption Perception Index (Source: Transparency International). The cross-national analytical structure enables us to provide feasible solutions for helping democratization in East Asia.




Figure 3: A Structural Equation Model for Analyzing Respondents' Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy

Table 1. A Structural Equation Analysis of Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy (within-country Effects)

	Independent variables	Coefficients/(t-value)/Significance
Main Model (within)	Economic Development > Democracy	
	Authoritarianism (Within)	-0.568 (-1.955) *
	Traditionalism (Within)	-1.002 (-0.867)
	Democracy > Economic Development	
	Authoritarianism (Within)	-0.483 (-2.302) **
	Traditionalism (Within)	0.683 (0.813)
	Authoritarianism (Within)	
	Traditionalism (Within)	1.546 (6.546) ***
	Area	-0.019 (-0.286)
	Income	0.004 (0.153)
	Educational Level	0.044 (6.512) ***
Control Variables (Attitudinal Variables)	Economic Development > Democracy	
	Satisfaction with Government	0.084 (0.533)
	Capability of Democracy	-1.235 (-5.421) ***
	Democracy > Economic Development	
	Satisfaction with Government	-0.034 (-0.616)
	Capability of Democracy	-0.577 (-2.647) *
	Satisfaction with Government	
	Economy Perception	-0.017 (-0.200)
	Corruption Perception	-0.001 (-0.014)
Control Variables (Personal Background)	Economic Development > Democracy	
	Area	-1.185 (-3.281) ***
	Income	-0.077 (-0.912)
	Educational Level	-0.146 (2.680) ***
	Democracy > Economic Development	
	Area	-0.314 (-2.492) ***
	Income	-0.020 (-0.571)
	Educational Level	0.001 (0.016)
	Authoritarianism (Within)	
Confirmatory Factor Analysis	Question 1	1 (-)
	Question 2	1.229 (18.237) ***
	Question 3	0.742 (6.356) ***
	Traditionalism (within)	
	Question 1	1 (-)
	Question 2	1.590 (2.642) ***
	Question 3	2.508 (5.791) ***
	Question 4	2.165 (3.848) ***

Table 2. A Structural Equation Analysis of Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy (between-country Effects)

Independent Variables		Coefficients/(t-value)/Significance
Economic Development > Democracy		
Main Model (Between)	GDP	0.310 (2.352) **
	GDP Growth	1.133 (3.479) *
	CPI	-1.165 (-1.438)
	FHI	0.496 (0.644)
Democracy > Economic Development		
Control Variables (Attitudinal Variables)	GDP	0.022 (0.575)
	GDP Growth	0.146 (0.996)
	CPI	0.113 (0.638)
	FHI	0.871 (4.386) **
Information Criteria		
	Akaike (AIC)	266773.311
	Bayesian (BIC)	267209.862
	Sample-Size Adjusted BIC	267019.190

Table 3. Expected Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy (within-country effect)

Within-Country Effects	Economic Development > Democracy	Democracy > Economic Development	Economic Development = Democracy
Authoritarianism=2	18.87%	22.37%	58.76%
Authoritarianism=3	12.84%	16.57%	70.58%
Capacity of Democracy =2	6.04%	22.53%	71.43%
Capacity of Democracy =3	2.05%	14.74%	83.21%
Area= Rural	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%
Area= Urban	15.01%	35.88%	49.11%
Family Income =2	30.42%	34.09%	35.48%
Family Income =3	29.02%	34.43%	36.56%
Education Level =2	27.17%	36.45%	36.38%
Education Level =5	19.38%	40.41%	40.21%

Table 4 Expected Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy (between-country effect)

Between-Country Effects	Economic Development > Democracy	Democracy > Economic Development	Economic Development = Democracy
Freedom House Index =1	41.16%	36.21%	22.63%
Freedom House Index =3	54.13%	36.87%	21.73%
GDP per capita =1000 (USD)	40.27%	30.19%	29.54%
GDP per capita =3000 (USD)	55.07%	23.21%	27.73%
GDP growth rate = 3	92.15%	8.52%	3.08%
GDP growth rate = 5	98.95%	0.71%	0.34%

Statistical Results

Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrate the statistical results. Since interpreting multinomial logit model via these statistical coefficients is complicated, for the convenience of discussion, we generate Table 3 and Table 4 to compare how experimental and control variables affect respondents' prioritizing of economic development and democracy.

As predicted above, the statistical result shows that respondents' authoritative tendency significantly leads respondents away from prioritizing democracy. As the authoritative tendency decreases from 3 to 2, the probability of respondents prioritizing economic development increases about 25%. In addition, respondents with authoritative tendencies are less likely to accept liberal democratic values or to view liberal democracy as being as important as economic development.

Unlike what we predict in Figure 1, traditionalism does not play a significant role in influencing respondents' choice between economic development and democracy. Table 1. shows that the coefficients of traditionalism are insignificant. In other words, respondents holding Asian traditional values do not significantly opt for economic development. This finding is different from Huntington's assertion that claims "Confucian democracy" is clearly a contradiction in terms (Huntington 1993, 307). Nevertheless, even though traditionalism does not directly affect

Asians' prioritizing of economic development and democracy, it provides fundamental support for authoritarianism and indirectly influences Asians' choice between economic development and liberal democracy. Table 1. shows that for those who hold traditional values, they are more likely to be committed to authoritarianism (coefficient: 1.549; t-value: 13.298).

The statistical results of the three-level structural equation model also demonstrates some interesting findings. First, respondents who depreciate the capacity of democracy are more likely to prioritize economic development. In addition, Table 1. and 3. show that in contrast to respondents living in urban areas, those who live in rural areas are more likely to opt for economic development. On the one hand, this finding reflects the rural-urban gap in economic development in East Asia. Rural people living in poor conditions are more concerned about their substantive material needs and thus urge economic development and depreciate democratic values. On the other hand, in contrast with city dwellers, rural people are more conservative and traditional. They tend to subordinate their own interests to authority instead of actively pursuing individual interests.

Table 1 and Table 3 also show how family income affects respondents' preference with respect to economic development and liberal democracy. In contrast with people from rich families, those of a poor family background are more likely to emphasize the importance of economic development and ignore civil and political rights. This concept can be represented by a Chinese proverb: "*yi shi zu er hou zhi rong ru*" (衣食足而後知榮辱), which states that people are concerned foremost with satisfying their basic needs, to be fed and clothed, before and over their personal dignity. Finally, the statistical results of within-county effects also presents an interesting finding: Even though a higher level of education lead respondents to opt for democracy, it also yields significant an increase in the probability of prioritizing economic development. Namely, people of a higher education background hold diverse preferences with respect to economic development and liberal democracy.

The between-country effects of the three-level structural equation model demonstrate the

cross-national comparison among Japan, Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. First, Tables 2. and 4. show straightforward results: In contrast with people in free democratic countries, people living under authoritarian regimes emphasize economic development. Nevertheless, Tables 2. and 4. also reveal that rapid economic development and high GDP per capita do not prompt Asians to embrace democratic values. Instead, as the annual growth rate of GDP per capita and the GDP per capita increase, the probability of opting for economic development also increases, that is, Asians are more likely to prioritize economic development. This finding is quite different from modernization theory that asserts that a positive linear relationship exists between levels of socioeconomic and democratic development (Lipset 1959). This finding reminds us of Przeworski and Limongi's argument that asserts that dictatorial regimes do not necessarily to experience a transition to democracy as they attain higher levels of economic development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).

VI. Conclusion and Discussion

Political scientists and human right activists have been devoted to installing democratic values into Asian societies. Modernization theory claims that economic development in authoritarian regimes produces well-educated, liberal, cosmopolitan, and middle class citizens (Lipset 1959, 83). These citizens are more likely to embrace democratic values and market economics and would become the force pushing authoritarian regimes toward democratization (Huber, Evelyne, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993, 72). Indeed, the statistics above do to some extent, prove that people with high family incomes and higher education levels are more likely to accept democratic values. Nevertheless, the same statistical results from the cross-national comparisons also remind us of the fact that the influences of economic development are two-fold. Rapid development and prosperity, on the other hand, not only fulfill authoritative leaders' promises of satisfying people's demands with respect to their material needs, while further strengthening the legitimacy of soft authoritarian regimes, but also encourage people to prioritize

higher economic development and persuade them into complying with government authority.

Thus, we suggest another route for installing democratic values into Asian society. As the statistics above demonstrate, although Asians are more concerned about their relations with family, neighbors, and society as a whole and are more likely to surrender personal interests that conflict with public interests, there is no evidence to support the assertion that Asians with traditional tendencies are less likely to accept democratic values. In other words, caring about family values and contextual relations does not hinder Asians from embracing democracy.

Nevertheless, traditionalism backs authoritarianism and indirectly blocks Asians' route toward liberal democracy. To consolidate the superior-subordinate relation and to strengthen their leadership, Asian dictators have selectively socialized traditional values and Confucianism as a state ideology in people's daily life (Hu 1997, 349). In fact, Asian tradition is rich in democratic values. For example, through *The Analects*, the most important Confucian document recording Confucius' thoughts, words, and deeds, the mutual benefit of the people is the core value that concerns him. He even people's confidence in rulers as the prerequisite in politics, prior to weaponry and food (The Analects 12:7). Confucianism also emphasizes the concept of benevolent rulers and warns rulers that torching people would result in the collapse of states (Mencius 7a:2; 7b:14). Positively, Asian tradition further requires rulers to accept blunt words, remonstrations, and good suggestions. Like social contract theory, Confucianism also asserts people's right to overwhelm a bad government. Killing despots is not considered as regicide, a crime or disloyal (Mencius 1b:8).

Hence, our suggestion is to disentangle traditionalism from authoritarianism. The traditions mentioned above might not be able to provide a foundation for democratization, but at least charge soft authoritarian regimes with the responsibility of taking care of all their people, instead of a majority of the people, and forbid Asian leaders from repressing minorities and social grievances. It also encourages authoritarian regimes and Asian society to accept dissent and comments on government policies and justifies the existence of opposite opinions in society.

Promoting these traditions not only justifies international intervention in human rights problems in authoritarian regimes, but also embeds democratic seeds into Asian society.

In this paper, we discuss the social and cultural background of Asians' strong support of economic development. As Asian human right activists suggest (Bell 2000, ch.1 and ch2), we assert that forcing authoritarian regimes in East Asia to accept the doctrines of liberal democracy does not work. Likewise, expecting that economic development in East Asia will automatically lead toward democratization seems naive. We argue that skillfully utilizing domestic knowledge and providing Asian traditions with democratic meanings would unleash traditionalism from authoritarianism and help the installation of democratic values into Asian society.

Appendix

Question for Measuring the Prioritizing of Economic Development and Democracy:

- ◆ If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?

Questions for Measuring Traditionalism:

- ◆ Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.
(Traditionalism 1)
- ◆ When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person. (Traditionalism 2)
- ◆ A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.
(Traditionalism 3)
- ◆ For the sake of his family, the individual should put his personal interests second.
(Traditionalism 4)

Questions for Measuring Authoritarianism:

- ◆ Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.
(Authoritarianism 1)
- ◆ The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. (Authoritarianism 2)
- ◆ Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.
(Authoritarianism 3)

Question for Measuring Economy Perception:

- ◆ *How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?*

Question for Measuring Corruption Perception:

- ◆ How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]?

Question for Measuring Capacity of Democracy:

◆ Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society 1

Democracy can not solve our society's problems 2

Question for Measuring Satisfaction with Government Performance:

◆ How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the [name of president, etc. ruling current] government?

References

- Arneson, Richard J. 1993. "Democratic rights at the national and workplace levels." In *The Idea of Democracy*, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 118–48.
- Arneson, Richard J. 2003. "Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 11(1):122–132.
- Bell, Daniel A. 2000. *East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bobbio, Norberto. translated by Daniela Gobetti. 1993. *Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition*. University of Chicago Press.
- Brown, Chris. 1997. "Universal Human Rights: A Critique." *International Journal of Human Rights* 1(2): 41-65.
- Collins, Susan M. and Barry P. Bosworth. 1996. "Economic Growth in East Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1996(2): 135-203.
- Cranston, Maurice. 1973. *What are Human Rights?* London: Bodley Head.
- Cranston, Maurice. 1983. "Are there any Human Rights?" *Daedalus* 112(4): 1-18.
- Donnelly, Jack. 1984. "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly*, 6(4): 400-419.
- Donnelly, Jack. 1986. "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis." *International Organization* 40(3): 599-642.
- Donnelly, Jack. 1999. "Human Rights, Democracy, and Development." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21: 608-632.
- Evans, Tony. 2002. "A Human Right to Health." *Third World Quarterly* 23(2) Global Health and Governance: HIV/AIDS: 197-215.
- Finnis, John. 1980. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. "Confucianism and Democracy" *Journal of Democracy* 6(2): 20-33.
- Gordon, Wendy. 1993. "A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property." *The Yale Law Journal* 102(7):1533-1609.
- Griffin, James. 2001. "First Steps in an Account of Human Rights." *European Journal of Philosophy* 9(3): 306-327.
- Hampton, Jean. 1986. *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*. Cambridge University Press.
- Harrison, Lawrence E. 1992. *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Hemham, Ralph. 2004. "Procedural Justice and Human Rights in International Sentencing." *International Criminal Law Review* 4: 185-210.
- Hood, Steven J. 1998. "The Myth of Asian –Style Democracy." *Asian Survey* 38(9): 853-866.
- Hu, Shaohua. 1997. "Confucianism and Western Democracy." *Journal of Contemporary China* 6(15): 347-363.
- Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. 1993. "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7(3): 71-85.
- Johnson, Charmers. 1994. "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan." In *The State (Critical Concepts)*, ed. John A. Hall. London, New York: Routledge.
- Kausikan, Bilahari. 1993. "Asia's Different Standard." *Foreign Policy* 92: 24-41.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69-105.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address." *American Sociological Review* 59(1):1-22.
- Neher, Clark D. 1994. "Asian Style Democracy." *Asian Survey* 34(11): 949-961.
- Oi, Jean C. 1994. "Rational Choices and Attainment of Wealth and Power in the Countryside." In *China's Quiet Revolution*, ed. David Goodman and Beverly Hooper. New York: Longman

Cheshire.

Pack, Howard. 1992. "Technology Gaps between Industrial and Developing Countries: Are There Dividends for Latecomers?" In *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics*, ed. Lawrence H. Summers and Shekhar Shah. Washington: World Bank.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49(2): 155-183.

Plant, Raymond. 1989. "Can There be a Right to Health Care?" *Institute of Health Policy Studies Occasional Papers* (Southampton: Institute of Health Policy Studies).

Plant, Raymond. 1993. "The Justification for Intervention: Needs before Contexts." In *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, ed. Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Pye, Lucian W. 1999. "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 29(4): 763-782.

Reischauer, Edwin O., and John K. Fairbank. 1960. *East Asia: The Great Tradition*. Houghton Mifflin.

Romer, Paul M. 1993. "Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 32(3): 543-73.

Roy, Denny. 1994. "Singapore, China, and the 'Soft Authoritarian' Challenge." *Asian Survey* 34(3): 231-242.

Shue, Henry. 1996. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Smart, Alan. 1997. "Oriented Despotism and Sugar-Coated Bullets: Representations of the Market in China." In *Meanings of the Market: The Free Market in Western Culture*, ed. James G. Carrier. Oxford, New York: Berg.

Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Marilou Uy. 1996. "Financial Markets, Public Policy, and the East Asian

Miracle.” *The World Bank Research Observer* 11(2): 249-76.

Tu, Wei-ming. 1996. “Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity.” *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 50(2): 12-39.

Tu, Weiming, Milan Hejtmanek, and Alan Wachman. 1992. *The Confucian World Observed: A Contemporary Discussion of Confucian Humanism in East Asia*. Honolulu, Hawaii : Institute of Culture and Communication, The East-West Center.

Vincent, R. 1986. *Human Rights and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zakaria, Farred. 1994. “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” *Foreign Affairs* 73(2): 109-126.