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Perceived Governance and Social Trust:
A Comparative Analysis in East
and Southeast Asia

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**Perceived Governance and Social Trust:
A Comparative Analysis in East and Southeast Asia**

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Abstract Two competing models have been presented in the literature on social trust. The society-centered model argues that social trust is the driving force for good governance, the state-centered model, on the other hand, contends that the causal arrow should be reversed. Numerous studies have tested the theories at the national level, but a country's level of social trust is usually measured through individual indicators and factors at the individual level should also be taken into account when analyzing the cause-effect pattern of social trust. This article tests the two conflicting theories simultaneously at the individual level using the ABS Wave 4 data. When pooling countries together, the society-centered model gets support. However, this finding should not mask the differences across countries. Analyzed separately, some countries are found to support the society-centered model while others are good examples of the state-centered theory. The mixed results demonstrate that there is no standard path to foster social trust in a country but in East and Southeast Asia at least, governance is the most common found factor that helps cultivate social trust.

Keywords social trust, perceived governance, SEM, East and Southeast Asia

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Introduction

Since the publications of *Making Democracy Work* and *Bowling Alone*, building social trust has been a concern for policymakers and scholars with the recognition that societies cannot function effectively without social trust (Putnam et al. 1994; 2001). Putnam's theory of social trust is a clear and simple one: the more people join voluntary associations, the more they trust each other. As a result, society will function more effectively since trust helps facilitate personal interactions with low cost. The political impact of social trust, then, is a well performed government trusted by its citizens.

The fascinating part of Putnam's theory is that there is nothing political in the mechanism of social trust, yet it has a profound impact on political outcomes. Studies of social trust have surged in number and influence, and the concept has been applied in numerous disciplines. In social sciences, researchers are concerned with the proposed effect of social trust on governance; if social trust does make democracy work, as Putnam put it, then, efforts should be geared to encourage people to join voluntary groups to foster trust, which in turn would lead to building an effective government. However, this society-centered model is challenged by scholars who argue that the causal arrow works in reverse, whereby the state plays a crucial role in bolstering trust (Levi 1998). The state-centered model contends that it is good governance that raises a society's trust level, and thus, the state should put efforts into building quality institutions to help cultivate social trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

Reflecting this apparent dichotomy, empirical studies have also reached mixed conclusions with findings sometimes support the society-centered theory while others the proponents of the state-centered model. Previous research, however, tends to conduct analysis at the national level, which might bias the results. Although social trust is regarded as a society' property, all of the measurements are self-report indicators via survey questions.

Thus, individual-level effects must be taken into account for an effective analysis to capture within-country variations. In other words, analysis at the national level might be misleading if factors at the individual level are omitted.

To fill the void, this article tests the theories at the individual level across several countries in East and Southeast Asia. Hypothesizing that there should be a reciprocal relationship between social trust and governance, the findings show that social trust affects the perception of governance but not the other way round when pooling countries together. Yet when analyzing countries individually, both society- and state-centered models are at work with the state-centered model playing a more prominent role in shaping social trust. The findings indicate that the peculiar state-society relations in East Asia where the state usually plays the leading role in structuring and shaping the characteristics of the society should be the underlying factor driving the results.

This article is organized as follows. In the next section, the competing models of social trust and governance are discussed in greater detail. Then, the relationship between social trust and governance is presented across the region. Data and statistical models used to test the proposed hypotheses are presented. Lastly, findings are reported, and their theoretical and policy implications discussed before concluding this article.

Two Perspectives on Causal Mechanisms

In his studies of Italy and the U.S., Putnam speculated that social trust was fostered by joining networks (more specifically, voluntary associations) that helped create solidarity, encourage civic participation, and foster integrity. As a result, citizens who join voluntary organizations tend to "...trust one another to act fairly and obey the law" (Putnam 1994 et al., p. 8). The theory of social capital states that the more people interact with each other, the more they trust each other, and vice versa (Putnam 1995, p. 665). A country with a high stock

of social capital and social trust not only has a functional society but also a responsive government. Therefore, this society-centered model advocates the revival of community life since it is the foundation of good governance.

On the other hand, some scholars argue that trust is not developed through civic life but by the state that can lower the risk of trusting anonymous others. Defining trust as a risk-taking behavior, when we trust someone, we are also willing to take the risk when that trust is abused. Thus, trusting entails a judgment we have on the anticipated goodwill that our fellows will return (Warren 1999). This judgment is based on the calculation that when the risk is low, it is less harmful to trust an unknown person. Therefore, the state can facilitate trust “by lowering the risk [to] the trusters, thus making it easier or less worrisome for [them] to concede trust to anonymous others.” (Offe 1999, p.71). The role of the state is to guarantee the return of goodwill by the trustees. Thus, when the rule of law is absent and transparency is low, the risk is high when trusting anonymous others because any loss is unlikely to be compensated through state apparatus.

The state-centered model, therefore, provides an alternative explanation to the social capital theory. While the society-centered model argues that social trust helps improve governance, the state-centered model contends that the causality should be reversed. Empirically, some findings support the society-centered model, in which vibrant social life helps foster trust, and in which social capital and governance have a positive, reciprocal relationship, with social capital’s impact on governance stronger than the other way round (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Paxton 2007; Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013; Paxton 2002; Robbins 2012). On the one hand, it has been found that good governance increases a society’s trust level (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). However, these studies in support of the state-centered model usually fail to test the reciprocal effect of social trust on governance. Moreover, the results are based on national-level analysis in which individual

factors are not accounted for.

To clarify the mixed results and to sort out the causal mechanism, this article conducts analysis at the individual level and hypothesizes that there is a reciprocal relationship between social trust and perceived governance. That is, social trust should have a positive impact on perceived governance, which in turn gives positive feedback to social trust and vice versa. With this null hypothesis, we will further investigate whether different mechanisms happen in individual countries when taking countries' peculiar conditions into account. Yet before delving into detailed analysis, let us first inspect the relationship between social trust and perceived governance across the region, which shows that a simple investigation like this can sometimes be misleading.

Social Trust and Perceived Governance in East Asia

Figure 1 shows the relationship between social trust and perceived governance. The indices were taken from the Asian Barometer Wave 4 (2014-16), in which social trust is the percentage of respondents answering "most people can be trusted". Perceive governance is a composite indicator taking the average of seven questions evaluating the state of governance in the country, including rule of law, social equality, transparency, and responsiveness (see wording in the appendix). The range of the indicator is from 1 "lowest evaluation" to 4 the highest.

The figure shows that there is a positive relationship between social trust and perceived governance. As the black regression line illustrates, in countries with a higher level of social trust, people there also tend to evaluate governance positively. However, there is a subgroup where the relationship is negative. The blue regression line shows that a high level of social trust is associated with negative evaluation of governance. Note that this graph cannot tell us whether it is social trust that leads to positive evaluation of governance or vice versa.

Moreover, perceived governance is likely to be subject to other individual factors that might bias the evaluation, yet those factors are ignored in the inspection. For instance, people in Korea and Taiwan gave a low score of governance compared to people in Thailand and Vietnam did even though objective evaluation of governance in the two countries is much better than the countries in the latter group.¹ Social trust is also subject to personal traits and circumstances. It is, therefore, necessary to take these factors into account to make the results conclusive.

Figure 1: The Relationship between Social Trust and Perceived Governance, cross-country Comparison

Data and Method

The test that follows aims to address two questions. First, we would like to know the causal mechanism between social trust and perceived governance and expect to see that they should have a reciprocal relationship or social trust should lead to better evaluation of governance (state-centered model). If, on the other hand, we observe the reversed causal mechanism (governance leads to social trust), this shows the incidence of the state-centered model. Second, this article also takes country's peculiar situations into account. Most cross-national studies tend to lump all countries together but this approach might get misleading conclusions when certain country circumstances are omitted in the analysis. Given this, we also run analysis in each individual country to test the hypothesis.

Accordingly, two stages of analysis will be carried out to reach conclusions. First, to

¹ Governance indicator compiled by the World Bank shows Korea has a score of 0.99, Taiwan 1.19, Thailand -0.10, and Vietnam -0.58 in 2014. The scores are the averages of evaluations on voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law. See details at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

understand whether it is perceived governance that affects social capital or vice versa, the unit of the analysis is at the individual level. We first divide countries into two groups, with group 1 containing countries with elections, including Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar. The second group is communist states, including China and Vietnam. The reason to separate countries in this way is to control factors that might bias the evaluation of governance. In countries with electoral competitions, evaluation of governance is likely to be affected by winner-loser gap. We then run analysis in individual countries to compare the results with those based on countries as a whole. If the results are dissimilar to the aggregate result, we further consider peculiar country conditions and re-adjust the model to get the final results.

Data used in this article comes from the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 4 (ABS 2014-2016). To measure respondents' level of social trust, this article relies on the question explained in the previous section. Besides perceived governance, we also control for trust in relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances and being members of formal organizations and having resource networks, factors that are theorized to foster social trust. Individual characteristics, such as gender, age, and income level are also controlled for. Those living in urban areas are also controlled for since the complex urban environment might lower the trust level. Social heterogeneity is also likely to affect one's generalized trust, thus, we also control for the majority of ethnic groups in heterogeneous societies. In homogenous societies, we use center-periphery divides with people residing in the center (usually the capital) being the majority. We expect to see that the majority should have a higher level of social trust due to their dominating status in the society. For perceived governance, besides social trust, we control for economic evaluation, satisfaction with the democratic system, need for system change, perception of income distribution, voting for the winning camp, and education, factors that might affect one's evaluation of governance. Voting for the winning camp is

omitted in communist states.

As the state-centered model argues that countries providing efficient protective devices are likely to have a high level of social trust, we also expect to see that people who think that the political institutions are impartial and responsive should also tend to have high stocks of social trust or vice versa. However, to test the two mechanisms simultaneously generates simultaneous equation problems. To solve these problems, this article uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to sort out the relationship.

The SEM model is displayed in Figure 2. This is a nonrecursive model, meaning that there are feedback loops between perceived governance and social trust. Although the two mechanisms are argued to have a recursive relationship, it is also possible that one factor reinforces the other, creating a reciprocal relationship between perceived governance and social capital. This model will help us detect two things. First, it will simultaneously test which causal route has a significant effect in each country. If only the effect of one route is statistically significant, we can conclude that the causal arrow runs from A to B, not the other way round. And second, if the effects of both routes are statistically significant, we can compare the coefficients and conclude one causal route has a larger effect than the other.

Figure 2 Specification of SEM Model

Findings and Discussion

Does evaluating governance positively result in a tendency to have high stocks of social trust, or vice-versa? The results of SEM show that in countries with elections and communist states alike, social trust leads to positive evaluation of governance but not the other way round. The result indicates that social trust, contributed by social network and narrow trust, is the driving force for better evaluation of governance, supporting the society-centered theory. Yet this

result is based on aggregate analysis and we assume that each factor affects social trust and perceived governance in a similar pattern across countries, which could be unrealistic. When analyzing countries individually, different patterns emerge to challenge the society-centered model.

Table 1 Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance, Pooled Analysis

Focusing on countries with elections, only Japan remains the true supporter of the society-centered model. Singapore and Malaysia are actually the proponents of the state-centered theory with the same predicted variables. People in these two countries tend to trust anonymous others when they perceive governance is of good quality, indicating those who have access to state apparatus might be the first to develop social trust. Although the two countries are heterogeneous society and from time to time face ethnic tensions, being majority (Chinese in Singapore and Malay in Malaysia) does not necessarily have a higher level of social trust. Actually, being majority lowers one's trust level in Malaysia. Given that the majority controls the state resources and should have an advantage to lower the risk of trusting, this is a surprising finding. However, facing the challenge from the minorities possibly posits an obstacle to develop trust beyond one's ethnic group. The real reason, therefore, is worth of further inspection.

Table 2 Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia

Additional three countries support the state-centered model but only after taking peculiar conditions into account. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, the perception of China's impact on own

country also affects perceived governance and social trust (in Hong Kong only). After controlling for this factor, these two cases become the incidence of the state-centered model, although the estimate for Taiwan is only significant at 0.1 level. Given the special relationships with China in these two societies and the student movements protesting against the governments close to Beijing, the result that those who think China's impact positive and evaluate governance positively is probably not surprising. However, positive perception of China's influence also affects social trust in Hong Kong, with those suspecting China more likely to develop social trust, which is an interesting finding worth of further inspection. A possible explanation is that opposing China becomes a factor strengthening solidarity and the rising Hong Kong identity might contribute to social trust in recent years. The level of social trust in Hong Kong has steadily increased since Wave 1 done in 2001 with a big jump in Wave 4, in conjunction with Hong Kong's changing political environment.² For Indonesia, we further controlled for religiosity on social trust and Java as majority on governance and the result supports the state-centered model.

Table 3 Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Indonesia

In Korea, the Philippines, and China, we found another mechanism. While perceived governance has positive feedback to social trust, social trust has a negative relationship with perceived governance. In the latter mechanism, people who have generalized trust tend to give poor evaluation of governance, which does not fit in the extant theories. However, if we assume that trust is also a by-product of networking and connection when people react to failed market and state, this might explain why we observe this mechanism at work. Studying

² The level of social trust is 29% in 2001, 32% in 2006, 40% in 2008 and 59% in 2016.

societies in newly democratized countries, Rose (2001) and Seligman (1992) both observed that the majority of the population in those countries relied on friends and relatives for mutual assistance. Ross explained that joining this kind of networks was a reaction to the failure of the state and market. Seligman also argued that people relied on primordial and ethnic linkages as the means of providing mutual help to lower the risk of trusting. Thus, those who depend on connections and mutual assistance groups might do so due to their suspicion of the state apparatus. Connection is the first criterion that people rely on to judge whether someone is trustworthy in China and Korea. The rampant clientelist networks in the Philippines also speak the same rationale. However, given that perceived governance contribute to social trust, it indicates that there might be two mechanisms pulling each other to the opposite direction. From the positive side, if the government continues to strengthening its governance quality, the negative effect of social trust might gradually disappear. Yet if governance is poor, social trust might eventually become a deficit, shown in the case of Cambodia and Myanmar. In these two countries, the society and the state are parallels with rich civic life and social trust mirrors the failure not the success of the state.

Table 4 Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Korea, China, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

The final group includes Thailand and Vietnam, where social trust has a positive relationship with perceived governance but perceived governance has negative feedback to social trust. These two countries tend to have a high level of social trust as the majority of the population still reside in rural areas where the environment is conducive to developing social network and trust. Yet Thailand has faced political turmoil for almost a decade and Vietnam is accelerating the process of modernization and witnesses rising inequality. While part of the mechanism claimed by the state-centered model is still at work, perception of governance

might become too polarized to effectively test its impact on social trust. Therefore, it needs further inspection on the matter in the future.

Table 5 Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Thailand and Vietnam

The findings suggest that in East and Southeast Asia, most countries support the state-centered model in which perceived governance contributes to social trust but not the other way round. We found such cases in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The results might not be surprising since the governments there still more or less play a paternalistic role overseeing the society. Fukuyama has argued that social capital and social trust is contingent on context, with some countries or regions tend to have a civic tradition that supports the society-centered model, while others do not (Fukuyama 2001). East and Southeast Asia is where the tradition of civic culture is absent. Next group is countries where governance has positive feedback to social trust but social trust has a negative relationship with perceived governance. The negative feedback of social trust might be due to the failed states and market in the past that still has its lingering effect. Although Korea and China have been improving governance, the efforts are still compromised by the behavior and attitude shaped under different circumstances. The Philippines also suffers from clientelism that is ubiquitous in both political and social arenas. Yet if governance is not improved, such as in Cambodia and Myanmar, social trust then turns to be a deficit to governance in which those trust each other more might trust the political institutions less.

The only case that supports the state-centered model is Japan. Although the model is partially supported by Thailand and Vietnam, there is another mechanism which cannot be explained. One possible reason is polarized politics that hinders us from having a proper inspection on the effect of governance on social trust. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that

social trust and governance are intertwined with political environment affecting both. Civic life and social trust might be developed in a world illustrated by Tocqueville where the intervention of the state in private life is limited. Yet with the intervention of the state, social trust then is subject to the influence of the political environment. Thus, the relationship between social trust and governance is context-laden and we cannot expect that one model can explain all. An interesting research topic, therefore, should ask why we sometimes see the society-centered model at work but at times the state-centered model, which will be the subject of future research.

A final word on the findings cautions poor model fit in several countries, which might provide misleading conclusions. The poor model fit is due to certain peculiar country conditions that have not been included in the model. Thus, further inspection on country circumstances should help us improve model specification to reach more conclusive findings.

Conclusion

This article tests two competing models speculating the relationship between social trust and governance. Using survey data gathered from countries in East and Southeast Asia and hypothesizing that social trust and governance should have a reciprocal relationship or social trust should lead to better evaluation of governance, the statistical result based on pooled analysis supported the hypothesis. Across East and Southeast Asia, people who trust anonymous others also tend to give positive evaluation of governance, which supports the state-centered argument. However, when analyzing countries separately, only Japan remained as the supporter of the state-centered model while Taiwan, Hong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are the proponents of the state-centered model. In these countries, people who evaluated governance positively tended to trust anonymous others more, yet level of social trust had no effect on perceived governance.

However, findings in China, Korea, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar show that social trust had a negative effect on perceived governance. People who possessed generalized trust were more likely to see governance in a negative light. Arguing that social trust might be a by-product of networking and connection as a means to counter failed state and governance, those who trust others might reflect such strategy to help them get by. Although governance has been improved in Korea and China, such strategy still has its lingering effect on the perception of governance. The final group contains Thailand and Vietnam. Although social trust still leads to positive perception of governance, positive perception of governance actually has a negative relationship with social trust. The reason is unclear but polarized politics might play a role to hinder us from analyzing the effect accurately.

Echoing what has been found before at the national level in which both the society- and state-centered models get empirical support, we also found mixed results in this small sample. Although an interesting question should ask why and under what conditions we would observe the society-centered model at work and under what circumstances the state-centered model, these initial findings point out that political environment or context is the key. The interaction between social trust and governance is context-laden and one should not expect that a model can explain all. Yet at least in East and Southeast Asia, the state is still the most prominent factor to cultivate social trust but it could also be the driving force to isolate the society from giving positive input into governance.

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
Appendix

Asian Barometer Survey Wave IV Questions

Variable	Wording
Social Capital	
Social trust	General speaking, would you say that “Most people can be trusted” or “that you must be very careful in dealing with people”?
Trust in relatives	How much trust do you have in each of the following types of people? Your relatives
Trust in acquaintances	How much trust do you have in each of the following types of people? Other people you interact with
Membership in formal organizations	Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?
Resource network	Are there people you could ask to help influence important decisions in your favor?
Perceived Governance	
Rule of law	Do officials who commit crimes go unpunished?
	When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.
	How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power?
Social equality	Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government
	All citizens from different ethnic communities in Country X
Responsiveness and Transparency	How well do you think the government responds to what people want?
	How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?

Tables and Figures

Figure 1: The Relationship between Social Trust and Perceived Governance, Cross-country Comparison



Source: Asian Barometer Wave 4 (2014-16)

Figure 2: Specification of SEM Model




Table 1: Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance, Pooled Analysis

	Countries with Elections		Communist States	
	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.
Perceived governance	-0.006		0.046	
Social trust		0.033*		0.048*
Male	-0.002		0.052***	
Age	0.101***		0.036*	
Area (rural-urban)	0.033***		0.045***	
Income sufficiency	0.034***		0.054***	
Trust in relatives	0.050***		0.068***	
Trust in neighbors	0.064***		0.163***	
Trust in people interacting	0.074***		0.119***	
Member of formal org.	0.020***		0.145***	
Resource network	0.056***		0.017*	
Majority/Center-periphery	-0.076***		0.105***	
Vote for the winner		0.082***		-
Economic evaluation		0.089***		0.032***
Perception of inequality		0.148***		0.120***
Satisfaction with D.		0.144***		0.243***
Education		-0.020***		0.011***
Change of system		0.150***	-1.168***	0.140***
Intercept	-0.887***	1.480***		1.760***
R ²	0.114	0.282	0.190	0.234
Model Chi square	243.692		288.817	
CFI	0.965		0.901	
IFI	0.966		0.902	
SRMR	0.008		0.016	
RMESA	0.033		0.061	
N	14171		5268	

Table 2: Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Japan, Singapore and Malaysia

	Japan		Singapore		Malaysia	
	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.
Perceived governance	-0.002		0.236***		0.049*	
Social trust		0.130*		-0.084		-0.067
Male	0.019		-0.020		0.012	
Age	0.199***		-0.066*		0.000	
Area (rural-urban)	0.018		--		0.048***	
Income sufficiency	0.060**		-0.016		0.013	
Trust in relatives	0.093***		0.042*		0.000	
Trust in neighbors	0.061*		0.091***		0.066***	
Trust in people interacting	0.105***		0.089***		0.019	
Member of formal org.	0.001		0.069**		-0.027	
Resource network	0.033		0.059**		0.027**	
Majority/Center-periphery	0.061*		-0.002		-0.063***	
Vote for the winner		0.070**		0.230***		0.137***
Economic evaluation		0.057***		0.025		0.047**
Perception of inequality		0.154***		0.033*		0.117***
Satisfaction with D.		0.149***		0.202***		0.220***
Education		0.012		0.012*		-0.039***
Change of system		0.166***		0.265***		0.141***
Intercept	-1.541***	1.230***	-0.951***	0.155***	-0.402***	1.824***

R ²	0.198	0.179	0.164	0.237	0.088	0.328
Model Chi square	58.751		76.457		40.206	
CFI	0.908		0.887		0.959	
IFI	0.911		0.891		0.690	
SRMR	0.014		0.017		0.010	
RMESA	0.052		0.066		0.037	
N	1081		1039		1207	

Table 3: Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Indonesia

	Taiwan		Hong Kong		Indonesia	
	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.
Perceived governance	0.084 ⁺		0.161***		0.327*	
Social trust		-0.004		0.026		-0.133
Male	0.028		0.241***		-0.013	
Age	-0.063		-0.059		0.023	
Area (rural-urban)	0.039***		--		-0.019*	
Income sufficiency	0.109***		-0.055**		-0.030*	
Trust in relatives	0.066**		0.114***		0.079***	
Trust in neighbors	0.105***		0.091**		-0.019	
Trust in people interacting	0.112***		0.367***		0.086***	
Member of formal org.	0.058*		0.070		0.008	
Resource network	0.051**		-0.026		0.080***	
Majority/Center-periphery	0.017		-0.264***			-0.046*
Vote for the winner		0.183***		0.172***		0.026
Economic evaluation		0.071***		0.105***		0.043***
Perception of inequality		0.178***		0.074***		-0.030*
Satisfaction with D.		0.065**		0.172***		0.059
Education		-0.016**		-0.008		0.001
Change of system		0.140***		0.214***		0.070***
China's impact		0.101***	-0.152***	0.256***	--	--

Religiosity	--	--	--	--	-0.005	--
Intercept	-0.837***	1.289***	-1.038***	1.356***	-1.266**	2.435***
R ²	0.152	0.320	0.321	0.562	0.060	0.015
Model Chi square	248.869		162.292		120.897	
CFI	0.794		0.907		0.693	
IFI	0.797		0.908		0.709	
SRMR	0.020		0.014		0.021	
RMESA	0.094		0.093		0.065	
N	1657		1217		1550	

Table 4: Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Korea, China, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

	Korea		China		Philippines		Cambodia		Myanmar	
	Social T.	Gov.	Social T.	Gov.	Social T.	Gov.	Social T.	Gov.	Social T.	Gov.
Perceived governance	0.245***		0.166***		0.195**		0.017		0.027	
Social trust		-0.140**		-0.085**		-0.452**		-0.105 ⁺		-0.157*
Male	0.038		0.053***		0.030		-0.040*		0.043*	
Age	0.161***		0.104***		-0.016		0.178***		0.113***	
Area (rural-urban)	0.012		0.041***		0.007		-0.056*		-0.023*	
Income sufficiency	0.008		0.024*		-0.018		-0.015		0.002	
Trust in relatives	0.073**		0.031*		0.056***		0.028		0.036*	
Trust in neighbors	0.172***		0.115***		0.015		0.067***		0.056**	
Trust in people interacting	0.101***		0.109***		-0.022		-0.002		0.082***	
Member of formal org.	0.067*		0.054		-0.060**		-0.004		-0.084***	
Resource network	0.025		0.027**		-0.013		0.007		0.032***	
Majority/Center-periphery	-0.112**		0.030		-0.043*		0.114		-0.021	
Vote for the winner		-0.017		--				0.184***		0.151***
Economic evaluation		0.042**		0.062***		0.006		0.051**		0.097***
Perception of inequality		0.110***		0.126***		0.118***		0.216***		0.092***
Satisfaction with D.		0.173***		0.214***		0.114***		0.201***		0.293***
Education		-0.023***		-0.010***		0.094**		0.008		-0.022***
Change of system		0.092***		0.136***		-0.037***		0.123***		0.242***
China's impact						0.060***				

Intercept	-1.863***	1.836***	-1.352***	1.773***	-0.432*	1.811***	-0.716***	1.237***	-0.751***	1.335***
R ²	0.170	0.154	0.073	0.239	0.002	0.079	0.077	0.404	0.110	0.295
Model Chi square	106.027		113.298		83.182		35.058		107.416	
CFI	0.843		0.939		0.809		0.972		0.890	
IFI	0.848		0.939		0.819		0.973		0.893	
SRMR	0.018		0.012		0.017		0.010		0.016	
RMESA	0.071		0.042		0.059		0.033		0.062	
N	1200		4068		1200		1200		1620	

Table 5: Determinants of Social Trust and Perceived Governance in Thailand and Vietnam

	Thailand		Vietnam	
	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.	Social Trust	Perceived Gov.
Perceived governance	-0.186*		-0.124*	
Social trust		0.184**		0.211***
Male	-0.052		0.062*	
Age	0.076		-0.017	
Area (rural-urban)	--		0.087***	
Income sufficiency	0.030		0.095***	
Trust in relatives	0.120***		0.087***	
Trust in neighbors	0.018		0.167***	
Trust in people interacting	0.154***		0.137***	
Member of formal org.	-0.050		0.169***	
Resource network	0.074***		-0.009	
Majority/Center-periphery	-0.241***		0.171***	
Vote for the winner	--	--	--	--
Economic evaluation		-0.031*		-0.029
Perception of inequality		0.063**		0.100***
Satisfaction with D.		-0.094**		0.155***
Education		0.001		0.024**
Change of system		-0.005		0.137***
BKK and South		-0.320***		
Intercept	-0.343***	0.165***	-0.766***	2.002***
R ²	0.197	0.081	0.250	0.169
Model Chi square	160.772		57.250	
CFI	0.747		0.935	
IFI	0.754		0.936	
SRMR	0.026		0.015	
RMESA	0.093		0.051	
N	1200		1200	