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Social and Ideological Sources of Partisanship

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Social and Ideological Sources of Partisanship

Kai-Ping Huang*

Abstract

This paper investigates the construct of ideology in the region of East and Southeast Asia. Applying cluster analysis, it is found that people in this region can be divided into two ideological camps; while the left wing contains people who are socially conservative but politically progressive, the right wing is represented by people who are less traditional but politically conservative. Investigating the social roots of the two wings, although the left wing is associated with voters with high education and social standing, it is not universal across the countries in the region. In terms of the relationship between ideology and partisanship, it is found that in only two countries (Taiwan and Singapore), ideology and partisanship have converged. In other countries, they are only partially converged or not converged at all. The findings show that programmatic party-voter linkage anchored via ideology is still less common in the region. Most parties rely on ethnic identity, communal ties, charismatic leaders, or clientelism to connect with voters, making party systems in the region less institutionalized.

Keywords: ideology, partisanship, social roots, East Asia, Southeast Asia

The social and ideological sources of partisanship occupy an important position in the studies of party politics and voting behavior in advanced democracies. Partisanship, when it matches with social characteristics and idealogical positions of individual voters, is an reliable cue for vote choice. Historical development of a particular country sets the stage for parties to cultivate their social roots in order to stabilize their linkages with voters. When parties occupy positions on a left-right ideological spectrum and appeal to voters on the similar positions, the party system is institutionalized in a way that outcomes of elections and policymaking will be more predicable.

Given that partisanship is an important indicator for political scientists to understand citizen politics, the sources of partisanship is an intriguing subject in both new and old democracies. In old democracies, it is found that the sources of partisanship are closely intertwined with industrialization and modernization in the 19th and 20th centuries (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Divisions along class and religion have long been salient issues separating voters' ideological orientation. However, new findings show that the old sources of partisanship–class and religion–have gradually lost their predicable power of one's inclination of party support (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Garzia, 2013). The changing climate of citizen politics in old democracies worry scholars since it is a sign of citizens' detachment from politics when parties lose their social roots. If such change is troublesome in old democracies, it is even so for new democracies, which usually do not have favorable conditions for parties to begin with.

New democracies usually share the features of un-institutionalized party system (Mainwaring, 1999). That is, parties usually do not have ideological orientation and they appeal to virtually all kinds of voters with different characteristics. The so-called "catch-all party" is a common phenomenon is newly democratized countries (Gunther and Diamond, 2001). Since parties of such do not solely depend on voters who share similar characteristics, the linkage with voters is weak and volatile. The result is a fluid party system in that no particular pattern of party competition can be

observed (Sartori, 1976). Given that parties' ideological appeal is important for the development of party system and democratization, it is necessary to understand whether there is any linkage between partisanship and ideology embedded in certain social characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, through detecting the distribution of ideological differences, I probe the social sources of ideology. Second, I examine whether there is any association between ideology and party identification. The findings will shed some lights for the studies of citizen politics and democracy in East and Southeast Asia. In what follows, I first discuss the relationship between social attributes, ideology and partisanship found in Western countries and East and Southeast Asia. I then outline the theoretical framework for analysis. I probe the distribution of ideology in East and Southeast Asia and find its social roots. Finally, I check whether there is any linkage between ideology and party identification. I discuss the findings and their theoretical implications before concluding this paper.

Social Attributes, Ideology, and Partisanship

Research on voting behavior has a long tradition in the United States. Using survey data scholars in Columbia University found social groups and attributes were strong predictors of vote choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). The finding challenged the mainstream understanding of vote choice at the time in which campaign strategy and short-term effects were considered the key factors determining vote choice. Building on the basis of Columbia School, scholars at the University of Michigan further theorized the relationship between social attributes and ideology and concluded that the relationship could be represented by partisanship or party identification (Campbell et al., 1980). Partisanship or party identification is defined as "...the sense of attachment or belonging that an individual feels for a political party" (Flanigan and Zingale, 1994, 50).[1] In *The*

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[1] In this paper, I will use partisanship and party identification (or party I.D.) interchangeably.

American Voter, it is discovered that partisan choice came from individual's issue positions and the psychological effect of likeness of (party) leaders (Campbell et al., 1980, 64–88). While psychological effect of likeness has a short-term impact, issue positions are derived from one's worldview or ideology, which is relatively long lasting.

Political ideology is "a set of fundamental beliefs or principles about politics and government: what the scope of government should be; how decisions should be made; what values should be pursued." (Flanigan and Zingale, 1994, 111). Accordingly, the fundamental beliefs are shaped by one's social origin and personal experiences. An individual's background gives him a set of values and interests that affect his viewpoint on politics. At the aggregate level, people with similar social attributes tend to share similar interests and beliefs. Such similarity or dissimilarity of worldviews lay the foundation of social cleavages. Social cleavages provide the guideline for party competition as parties strive for representing the interests of different social groups (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sundquist, 1983). When parties and social cleavages converge, partisanship emerges. In Europe, for instance, working class tends to identify with socialists parties. In the United States, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party attract voters from different segments of the society. Despite under the changing climate of social values, partisanship is still a reliable cute for vote choice and the prediction of electoral outcomes.[2]

In the Context of East and Southeast Asia

Most countries in East and Southeast Asia are newly democratized countries under the third wave of democratization. Although sharing the common history of authoritarian rules, the nature and the characteristics of authoritarian rules are disparate. There are military rules like

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[2]Latest research, however, finds that partisanship gradually losses its predicting power on vote choice in Europe. Moreover, more citizens in Western democracies do not identify with any party, which might have detrimental consequences on representative democracy. See Garzia (2013), Dalton and Wattenberg (2002), and Dalton and Weldon (2007).

South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. There are one-party rules like Taiwan and Mongolia. Furthermore, the level of economic development is various as well. The institutional design are different as well, ranging from presidential system to parliamentary system. Given that parties and party systems are important to the consolidation of democracy, understanding the relationship between voters and parties in the region adds knowledge to the study of citizen politics as a whole.

Previous studies of the topic have been limited due to the availability of survey data. Early research depended on expert survey to understand the characteristics of political parties in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It was discovered that democracy versus authoritarianism separated parties in Korea and Taiwan. In Japan, international standing and national defense issues delimited party positions (Huber and Inglehart, 1995). With more data available, several studies explored the sources of partisanship in the region using Western democracies as benchmark. Through survey data researchers are able to compare voters' perceptions of party positions on a left-right spectrum to judge whether parties convey clear messages to voters to distance themselves from other parties.

Leaving the meaning of left-right ideology open, it is found that voters in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were able to pin down the positions of major parties that were largely in agreement with experts' interpretation (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). The Filipino voters, on the other hand, put major parties on similar positions, indicating that parties in the Philippines did not express clear ideological positions to voters. Probing value differences among voters and their partisan choice, the Authoritarian-Libertarian values could only explain partisanship in Japan but not Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Lee, 2007). In terms of social roots, investigation shows that the only socio-economic indicator that was constantly significant to explain whether voters identified with any party was age; old people were more likely to have party I.D. compared with young people (Sheng, 2007). The Lipset-Rokkan paradigm of social cleavages had only modest explanatory power

of understanding vote choice (McAllister, 2007).

The findings point out several characteristics of party systems in the region. First, due to the peculiar model of economic development in this region (ex. state-guided development), class division is not salient to the choice of parties and votes due to the suppression or co-option of labor unions. Second, there are very few religious parties in the region, except Japan and Indonesia. Although voters might be religious, due to the secular nature of most parties, religious division usually does not carry the predicting power of voting behavior. Instead, center-periphery and/or rural-urban divisions are more a factor determining vote and partisan choice. This is not surprising since the capital cities are usually the center of all kinds of arrangements in the region, including politics, economy, and culture. The gap between center and periphery or rural and urban is large due to different pace of social change in different locations, which sows the seeds for potential conflicts. Finally, the structure of parties and party systems are weakly institutionalized and parties usually do not have solid social bases to appeal to. Thus, social divisions usually do not have corresponding parties to entrust. Parties might campaign on valence issues (e.g. anti-corruption, social welfare, economy, etc.) but rely on clientelism, communal ties or ethnic identity to solicit votes. Lacking distinguished programmatic appeals among parties is the main reason why party system is less institutionalized in the region.

Although the existing studies discover important information about the sources of partisan choice in several Asian countries, they do not investigate the social roots of ideology (or values) and its linkage with partisanship. This paper examines the relationships simultaneously and extend the investigation to nine countries in the region.

Theory and Proposition

Based on the discussion above, I outline the theoretical framework of the sources of partisanship in this section. From research in Western democracies we know that the important source of partisanship is ideology derived from social cleavages. When parties come to claim the positions on the left-right spectrum and cultivate their linkages with corresponding social groups, durable and solid social roots are developed between parties and voters. Partisanship originated from this source provides a good cue for vote choice and other political behavior. Figure 1 displays the theoretical framework. The solid lines illustrates the tri-relationship between social cleavages, ideology and partisanship. The dash line, however, represents social cleavages that do not go through ideological differences. This kind of social cleavages includes communal or identity divisions, which are common in new democracies. Although the main concern is ideology, I also investigate other sources in this paper.

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework

Using this theoretical framework we can deduce some propositions about the sources of partisanship in East and Southeast Asia. The theoretical framework states that there are two

stages of analysis. First, the structure of ideology is embedded in a country's social structure. The nature of social cleavages, however, depends on the historical development of a particular region and/or a country. Studies in Europe and the United States find that the sources are intertwined with overall social changes triggered by large-scale forces, such as industrialization and modernization. Recent studies show that different large-scale forces happened in different time points can shape different cleavage structure. That is, social cleavages and their product–ideology–are context-laden. Comparing the constructs of left-right ideology in Western and Eastern Europe, Thorisdottir et al. (2007) found that preference for equality was associated with left-wingers in Western Europe while with right-wingers in Eastern Europe. Communist legacy certainly plays a role here. Thus, when investigating social cleavages and ideology, context should certainly be taken into account.

Following Jost, Federico and Napier (2009), this paper applies the definition of left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology through two types of attitudes–resistance to change and rejection of equality. Resistance to change is closely related to one's traditional orientation while rejection of equality is based on one's social standing as "haves". In East and Southeast Asia, given the authoritarian legacies and the unequal distribution of income and power on one hand and the level of economic development on the other, the relationship between traditionalism and rejection of equality might be negative. Like in Eastern Europe, people might be conservative about social and family issues but prefer equal distribution of power and resources. They also prefer a governing style that is different from the authoritarian past. Thus, I expect to see a similar ideological distribution as the one found in Eastern Europe.

Second, while assuming that there is always an ideological difference in a society, its effect on politics, however, is through party position. As discussed earlier, most parties in East and Southeast Asia do not have distinguished positions in terms of ideology. For parties that rely on clear positions, they usually enjoy stable support bases and presumably, solid partisanship. The

second stage of analysis, therefore, is to investigate if there is any link between ideology and party identification. I treat the second source of partisanship as the alternative hypothesis when there is no link between ideology and party I.D.

Given the mode of transition to democracy, I expect to see that countries whose transition is from one-party system are more likely to have such party-ideology linkage since the formation of opposition party is to fight against the authoritarian governing party. This includes Mongolia and Taiwan. Although power alteration hasn't happened in Malaysia and Singapore, given the momentum gained by the opposition in recent years, I also expect to see such linkage in these two countries. Korea and Japan, based on the previous findings, should also show a similar trend. For Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand the results are less predictable given that the opposition did not have a unified force to fight against. However, I expect that ethnic identity and communal ties should be important to determine partisanship in the three countries.

Data and Model

The data investigated here is Asian Barometer Survey Wave III.[3] I include nine countries in the analysis. Among them, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are liberal democracy. Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand are categorized as electoral democracy. I also include two electoral authoritarian regimes–Malaysia and Singapore –in the analysis. Although these two countries have long been dominated by one party (coalition), the oppositions begin gaining forces in these two countries, making electoral competition more interesting and significant.

To prob the ideological difference among voters, I extract questions concerning traditional values and authoritarian orientation from the survey. For authoritarian orientation, however, I focus on questions concerning how the state should be governed. Those questions are to some extent

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[3]See details at www.asianbarometer.org

related to traditional values but they emphasize the values in the political arena. It is possible that people might be conservative about social order and family issues but progressive about governing matters. All the variables are recoded so that larger number means less traditional/authoritarian. The wording of questions and coding can be found in Appendix A.

Assuming that there is ideological difference among voters along a left-right spectrum but the position is not observed in the survey data, this paper applies cluster analysis to categorize voters to be either on the left or right side of the spectrum. Cluster analysis is a technique to simplify data. Depending on how individuals answer the questions, they are grouped together or separated according to the distance they are from the group centers. Although we usually treat ideology as a continuum, here we regard them as types. That is, we assume that within groups members are relatively homogeneous and thus they can be differentiated from another homogeneous group. To conduct cluster analysis, I first find the optimal number of clusters using Calinski criterion. Then, using k-means clustering to categorize observations into the optimal numbers of clusters. Furthermore, the critical indicators are identified to understand the characteristics of each cluster. See the technical details in Appendix B.

The identified clusters are further investigated to find their associations with socio-economic indicators and partisanship. For the association between ideology and socio-economic indicators, I simply compare the means/proportions of those indicators between groups. To investigate the relationship between ideology and partisanship, logistic regression is applied. If a socio-economic indicator is statistically different among clusters, that indicator is omitted in the regression analysis to avoid multicollinearity.

Finding

Across the nine countries, two clusters are constantly identified. The two clusters can be described as socially conservative but politically progressive cluster on one hand, and socially progressive but politically conservative on the other. That is, while people who are traditional about social and family issues, they prefer a more open and liberal government. On the other hand, people who are less traditional are not strongly against a more authoritarian style government. Although there is difference, the difference in traditional values between clusters is relatively marginal compared with the difference in governing issues. Figure 2 illustrates the core locations of the two clusters across countries. Note that Cluster 1 captures socially conservative but politically progressive group and Cluster 2 is the opposite (higher values mean more progressive on both dimensions). I term the two clusters left wing and right wing, respectively.[4]

All countries show a similar pattern as we can find the left wing in the upper left corner while the right wing in the lower right corner. Unlike the left-right ideology in Western Europe, where socially and politically conservative ideologies tend to go together, this is not the case in East Asia. Like their counterparts in Eastern Europe, people who are traditional do not indicate that they are also politically conservative. Preference for an open and liberal government may be associated with one's position in the political system; people who feel marginalized might be against an authoritarian type of government. Investigating the relationship between ideological differences and socio-economic characteristics can help understand the sources of the ideology.

Since we have two clusters, a simple T-test or Z-test can help us detect whether people in the two clusters are statistically different in their socio-economic attributes. Table 1 lists those important attributes across countries. Education is an indicator that constantly appears to be different between the two groups. Across countries, the average of educational level of the

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[4]Unlike Jost, Federico and Napier (2009) who define left-right ideology based on traditionalism, I reverse the direction and define it based on governing issues.

Figure 2. Construct of Ideology across Countries

left-wingers is higher than the average of the right-wingers, indicating that education is associated with progressive political thinking. The only exception is Mongolia and Thailand, where people in the right wing have higher educational level on average. The next frequent indicator is religion. Left wing is associated with people who either believe other religion or have fewer believers of the mainstream religion of the country. Taiwan's left-wingers, however, have fewer non-believers than people of the right wing.

Gender apparently is important in several countries; men are more likely than women to be politically progressive but socially conservative. Women, on the other hand, show the opposite trend to be socially progressive but politically conservative. Other indicators include age, social status, income sufficiency, and percentage of urban dwellers. In general, young people, high social status, sufficient income, and urban dwellers are associated with left wing. In Thailand, however, the left wing is on the opposite of the general trend. People of the left wing are older, have lower

Table 1. Significant Social Roots of Ideology across Countries

Demographic	Japan		Korea		Taiwan		Mongolia		Philippines		Thailand		Indonesia		Singapore		Malaysia	
	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R
Age	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	45	38	43	44	39	-	-
Gender (% male)	53	42	53	46	58	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	48	-	-	-	-
Education	7.3	6.7	7.1	7.0	-	-	5.1	5.9	6.5	5.8	4.0	5.0	5.3	3.9	-	-	5.9	5.4
Social status	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.3	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	5.8
Income sufficiency	3.2	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.5	-	-	-	-
Urban (%)	83.6	77.6	-	-	8.6	12.8	2.2	6.1	1.5	3.6	19.2	29.9	36.9	25.4	-	-	-	-
Religion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92.8	96.9	83.6	89.2	-	-	-	-
Language	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.6	9.5	12	6.9	-	-	-	-	6.0	12.2

Note 1: Religion refers to no religion in Taiwan, other religion in Mongolia, Islam in the Philippines and Indonesia, and Buddhism in Thailand.

Note 2: Language refers to Ilonggo in the Philippines, southern Thai in Thailand,

and Bahasa Melayu dan Inggeris (Malaysian English) in Malaysia.

Note 3: The significant level of all entries are smaller than .5.

social status and contain a lower percentage of urban dwellers. So does the left wing of Mongolia; the averages of educational level and social status are lower than those of the right wing. Singapore's left wing also has a higher age than the average of the right wing. Finally, the importance of language only appears in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The left wing has more Ilonggo speakers in the Philippines and southern Thai speakers in Thailand. In Malaysia, the left wing has fewer Malaysian English speakers compared with the right wing.

It is difficult to conclude the common pattern of association between ideology and socio-economic indicators. Although in most countries, left wing is related to higher social standing, as the theory of human development explains (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), for those who are marginalized in a political system, a desire for an open and liberal government is in line with their interests (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992). Thus, with different context and conditions, the social roots of left wing can be disparate from the general pattern. Thailand is such a case in point. Given the political conflict in Thailand in the past few years, with the awakening of poor and rural voters who question the existing social and political orders, this might explain why Thailand is different from other countries.

Now we have detected the ideological difference and their social roots in each country, do political parties align with voters according to the ideological difference? That is, do political parties try to build linkage with voters through ideology? Among the nine countries, only partisan choice in Taiwan and Singapore can be fully explained by the ideological difference. That is, the two groups have distinguished party supporters (Table 2). Left-wing voters tend to identify with the Pan-Green parties and right-wing voters are more likely to identify with the Pan-Blue parties in Taiwan. Further analysis shows that the Pan-Blue supporters have relatively high social status and high education and are less likely to be Min-Nam speakers. To the contrary, young people and Min-Nam speakers tend to identify with the Pan-Green parties. In Singapore, left-wingers have

a higher proportion of identifiers of other parties, while people of the right wing tend to identify with the People's Action Party (PAP). Further analysis discovers that beside right wingers, Chinese speakers are also likely to be PAP identifiers. To the contrary, Buddhists, Muslims, and Chinese speakers are less likely to identify with other parties. Overall, it seems that different opinions on governing issues are sufficient to determine people's partisan affiliations. Those who prefer more progressive governing have the tendency to identify with other parties instead of the old dominant party.

Table 2. Sources of Partisanship: Taiwan and Singapore

	Taiwan		Singapore		
	KMT	DPP	PAP	Other party	
(Intercept)	-3.012***	-0.496	-0.235	-0.959	(Intercept)
Right wing	0.926***	-0.754***	0.271*	-0.764**	Right wing
Age	0.007	-0.010*	0.066	-0.649*	Buddhist
Education	0.108**	-0.058	0.349	-0.897*	Muslim
Social status	0.097**	-0.003	0.373**	-0.530*	Chinese
Min-Nam	-0.348**	0.330*			
Other religion	0.569**	-0.358			
N	1517	1517	907	907	
Pseudo R^2	0.113	0.058	0.026	0.076	

Note 1: The intercept includes left wingers, Mandarin speaker, and traditional folk religion in Taiwan.

The intercept includes left wingers, English speakers, and those who decline to specify their religion

in Singapore.

Note 2: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

The idealogical difference is only able to partially explain partisanship in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. That is, ideological difference can explain partisan choice for a particular party but not its major rival party. In Korea, left wingers are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party but the right wing is not associated with the Grand National Party. Overall, identifiers of the Grand National Party tend to be older and urban dwellers and have sufficient income to cover expenses (Table 3). The result is largely in agreement with the outcome of the latest 2012 presidential election.[5] In Thailand, the proportion of identifiers of the Prajadhipat Party in the left wing is statistically significant. Besides left wingers, supporters of the Prajadhipat party also include voters who speak Yawee and other languages. Isan speakers are less likely to identify with the Prajadhipat party. Voters who identify with the Pheu Thai party tend to be male and speak northern Thai and Isan. Given the current situation in Thailand, where regional division has become important in party politics, that division can sometimes mask people's real interests. Actually, a lot of Thais in the North and Northeast share similar ideology with their fellows in the South but they opt for different parties to represent them.

Malaysia shows the same pattern (Table 4). Right wing has significant BN identifiers. Besides right wing, the BN supporters are more likely to be older, female, have relatively insufficient income and speak Bahasa Malayu and other languages. The opposition party, however, seems to attract only male respondents. Note that there are many non-identifiers and people who can't determine which party to identify with. People of the left wing are likely to be non-identifiers together with young people and Buddhists. Among those who cannot choose party I.D., they are likely to be urban dwellers, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs. Overall, the ideological difference can explain the partisan choice for BN, the long dominating political coalition, and for non-identifiers or people who give "can't choose" for an answer. The opposition coalition, although gaining influence,

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[5]The Grand National Party changed the name to the New Frontier Party in 2012.

Table 3. Sources of Partisanship: Korea and Thailand

	Korea		Thailand		
	GNP	DP	Prajadhipat	Pheu Thai	
(Intercept)	-3.967***	-0.0467	-0.633*	-2.761***	(Intercept)
Right wing	0.187	-0.369*	-0.594***	-0.093	Right wing
Age	0.041***	-0.008	-0.097	0.517**	Male
Social status	-0.009	-0.154**	-0.144	2.476***	Northern Thai
Income sufficiency	0.230*	0.102	-2.243***	1.259***	Isan
Urban	0.751***	-0.262	0.735**	0.673	Yawee and other
N	1160	1160	1429	1429	
Pseudo R^2	0.094	0.024	0.166	0.128	

Note 1: The intercept includes left wing and rural dwellers in Korea.

The intercept includes left wing and Central Thai speakers.

Note 2: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

is less likely to be identified by those who don't choose BN. Compared with the result of the 2013 general election, there seems a clear divide in Malaysian society, where a segment of the population strongly supports the opposition coalition. This divide, however, is not shown in the survey. Nonetheless, it is possible that declaring one's party I.D. is sensitive and thus people opt for other neutral answers.

The final group covers countries where partisan choice cannot be explained by ideological divide. It is surprising to find Japan in this group given that it demonstrates clear partisan divide found in previous research (ex. urban-rural divide). Investigating the linkage between ideological difference and socio-economic indicators that cannot be explained by the left-right ideology, age

Table 4. Sources of Partisanship: Malaysia

	BN	Other party	No ID	Can't choose
(Intercept)	-0.125	-1.765***	-0.258	-2.734
Right wing	0.337**	-0.251	-0.430*	-0.059
Age	0.021***	-0.007	-0.038***	-0.006
Male	-0.367**	0.516	0.136	0.067
Income sufficiency	-0.170*	0.041	0.170	0.161
Urban	-0.459**	0.125	0.067	0.709***
Buddhist	-0.837***	-0.223	0.991***	0.859***
Christian	-0.392	-0.113	0.196	0.738*
Bahasa Melayu	0.820***	-0.100	-1.504***	0.053
Other language	0.798**	-0.090	-1.120***	-0.197
N		1168		
Pseudo R^2	0.129	0.024	0.135	0.087

Note 1: The intercept includes left wing, Muslims, rural dwellers,

and Malaysian English speakers.

Note 2: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

is the variable that shows constant influence over the choice of partisanship. Old people tend to

identify with either the DPJ or the LDP, while young people tend to be non-identifiers or identify

with other party. People with higher social status also tend to identify with the LDP (Table 5). It

seems that the DPJ has lost its traditional support base in urban area and now competes with the

LDP for the similar voting pool. In Mongolia, although the left wing has more MPRP identifiers

and the right wing has more DP identifiers, the difference is not statistically significant. Further analysis shows that old people tend to identify with MPRP, while young people opt for DP or tend to be non-identifiers. Overall, there is generational divide in Japan and Mongolia. Young people in these two countries are relatively alienated from parties.

Table 5. Sources of Partisanship: Japan and Mongolia

	Japan		Mongolia		
	DPJ	LDP	MPRP	DP	
(Intercept)	-2.625***	-2.663***	-1.756***	0.171	(Intercept)
Right wing	0.128	-0.152	-0.123	0.013	Right wing
Age	0.019***	0.013***	0.026***	-0.017***	Age
Social status	.065	0.086*			
N	1834	1834	1181	1181	
Pseudo R^2	0.028	0.016	0.053	0.022	

Note 1: The intercept includes left wing and rural dwellers in Japan.

The intercept includes left wing in Mongolia.

Note 2: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

Indonesia and the Philippines both have multi-party system. Although Indonesia once was considered to have a more institutionalized party system than the one of the Philippines, some worry that it has become more like their Filipino counterpart (Hicken, 2006; Ufen et al., 2007). The worry is not without reason. The number of party identifiers has decreased over the years in Indonesia. In 2004, party identifiers were 54% among the respondents, finds the CNEP survey. In the 2006 ABS Wave II survey, only 36% of the respondents had party I.D. In the Wave III survey, that figure further dropped to 30%. As well known in Indonesian politics, ethnic identities

play a role in partisan support. Further analysis shows that Javanese speakers are less likely to identify with Golkar and more likely to opt for "can't choose" (Table 6). It also shows that DPIP-Struggle, which previously enjoyed support from Javanese, lost its proponents. People with higher social status are likely to identify with DPIP-Struggle or other party. Note that there are many Islamic parties in the category of other party, and Christians and Sudanese speakers are less likely to identify with them. Overall, ethnic identity and religion still play important roles in partisan choice in Indonesia but the line has become blurred.

Table 6. Sources of Partisanship: Indonesia

	DP	Golkar	PDIP	Other party	Can't choose
(Intercept)	-3.411***	-2.838***	-2.926***	-2.499***	1.354***
Right wing	0.123	-0.230	-0.276	-0.204	0.192
Social status	0.099	-0.037	0.147*	0.098*	-0.113***
Christian	0.115	0.657*	0.375	-0.896**	0.009
Javanese	-0.376	-0.926*	0.153	-0.351	0.416**
Sundanese	-0.446	0.374	0.444	-1.338*	0.397
Other language	-1.302***	0.238	-0.406	-0.294	0.522**
N			1486		
Pseudo R^2	0.042	0.030	0.035	0.039	0.040

Note 1: The intercept includes left wing, Muslims, and Indonesian speakers.

Note 2: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

In the Philippines, the characteristics of party identifiers spread out across parties (Table 7). It shows that old people tend to identify with the NP, the oldest party. Urban dwellers tend to identify with the LP. Ilonggo speakers tend to identify with other parties. The ideological difference does

not play a role here in explaining partisan choice. Overall, it is difficult to draw the pattern of party competition in the Philippines.

Table 7. Sources of Partisanship: the Philippines

	Age	Urban	Cebuano	Ilonggo	other language	Pseudo R^2
LAKAS	-0.0108	-0.044	0.504	0.156	-0.231	0.020
LP	0.0001	0.415*	0.026	0.156	0.253	0.022
NP	0.0298***	-0.015	0.395	0.542	1.406***	0.080
NPC	-0.014	-0.473	0.288	0.216	0.173	0.029
LDP	-0.012	0.079	-0.065	-0.833	0.558	0.032
PMP	-0.001	0.127	-0.701**	-1.136*	-0.706*	0.039
PDP-LABAN	-0.039*	-0.105	-0.157	-0.839	-16.202	0.079
Other Party	.002	1.331	-.003	1.573*	0.847	0.078
No ID	-0.001	-0.287*	-0.043	0.007	-0.565*	0.021
N				1195		

Note 1: Non significant variables and standard errors not reported.

Significance level: *< .05, **< .01, and ***< .001.

Discussion and Conclusion

Using survey data, this paper discovers the construct of ideology in the region of East and Southeast Asia. The construct of ideology in the region is similar with the one found in Eastern Europe. The left side of the ideological spectrum is represented by people with traditional values but progressive thinking in politics. The right side, on the other hand, is occupied with people who are less traditional but politically conservative. Although in general left-wingers are relatively well educated and well-being, in Mongolia and Thailand it is the opposite. Given that politically

progressive voters prefer a government different from the old one, we expect that the left wingers should tend to identify with the major rival party of the old authoritarian party if that rival party succeeded to build connection with the left-wing voters. On the other hand, right wingers should be more likely to identify with the succeeding party of the authoritarian party. We do find that right-wingers tend to identify with the old (or) incumbent parties (e.g. Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia), the rival opposition parties, however, do not necessarily gain support from left wingers. Several former opposition parties had gained the chance to rule the countries but poor performance alienated them from their potential voters. Japan is such a case in point. Failure of the opposition parties to establish linkage with those voters might to some extent halt the progress in democratization.

Besides ideology, we also find that ethnic identity, religion, and urban-rural divide also play important roles to explain partisan choice. Although these socio-economic characteristics are sometimes aligned with ideological difference, when they are not it indicates that party-voter linkage might be established via clientelism or charismatic leaders.[6] Clientelist and charismatic party-voter linkages are less stable compared with programmatic linkage anchored by ideology. Moreover, sometimes they might make voters blind to see their true interests. Despite a clear ideological division, left wingers in Thailand split to support different parties that they regard as "their " parties. Regional division and clientelist appeal to some extent hinder the Thai party system to become institutionalized.

Partisanship is an important indicator for political scientists to understand voting behavior and the characteristics of party system. When partisan choice coverages with social cleavages, it helps stabilize party competition and institutionalize party system. In East and Southeast Asia, there is the sign of such converge in several countries. However, failure of the opposition parties

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[6]See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) for details about the types of party-voter linkage and their consequences for party politics.

to build connection with the segment of population who have the potential to support them halts the progress of further democratization. Overall, the majority of parties in the region still rely on other appeals rather than ideology to attract voters. This phenomenon explains why most party systems in the region are less institutionalized compared with their Western counterparts.

Appendix

A. Wording and Coding of Questions

Question	Wording
Traditional value	
q50	For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.
q51	In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group's collective interest.
q52	For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed.
q53	When dealing with others, developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one's immediate interest.
q55	Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.
q56	When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.
q57	Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher.
q58	In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group.
q59	Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict.
q61	Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate.
Governing Issue	
q75.	Statement 1. Government is our employee, the people should tell government what needs to be done. Statement 2. The government is like parent, it should decide what is good for us. (scale reversed)
q76.	Statement 1. The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without government control. Statement 2. The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that might be politically destabilizing. (scale reversed)
q77	Statement 1. People should look after themselves and be primarily responsible for their own success in life. Statement 2. The government should bear the main responsibility for taking care of the wellbeing of the people.
q138	The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws.
q139	Women should not be involved in politics as much as men.
q140	People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.(scale reversed)
q141	Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.
q146	If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything
q147	If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.
q148	When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.
Coding 1: 1=strongly agree, 3=N.A, can't choose, 5=strongly disagree for all questions except q75-77. Coding 2: 1=strongly agree, 1=N.A, can't choose, 3=strongly disagree for q75-77 only.	

B. Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis is a statistical technique to differentiate similar and dissimilar observations based on the variables of interest. The technique usually involves two procedures. First, a research can either specify the number of clusters ahead or leaves it for the computer to decide. The paper applies the first method. After the number of cluster is given, observations are arbitrarily assigned to groups and reassigned based on the distance each observation is from the nearest mean. To do so, heuristic algorithms are applied to conduct the process. This paper uses k-means algorithm and the method of euclidean distance as metric.

The purpose of k-means clustering is to minimize the within-cluster sum of squares. That is,

$$\arg\min_{s} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{x_j \in S_i} \|x_j - \mu_i\|^2$$

where μ_i is the mean of points in S_i. The standard algorithm involves two steps. Step 1 is to assign each observation into the cluster whose mean is closest to it. The condition is set as

$$S_i^{(t)} = \{x_p : \|X_p - m_i^{(t)}\| \leq \|x_p - m_j^{(t)}\| \forall 1 \leq j \leq K\}$$

The condition states that each observation can only be assigned to one of the clusters initially. The second step is to update the assignment by calculating the new means to be the centroids of the observation in the new clusters. That is,

$$m_i^{(t=1)} = \frac{1}{|S_i^{(t)}|} \sum_{x_j \in S_i^{(t)}} x_j$$

The algorithm has converged when no observation is reassigned.

Since the k-means clustering requires specifying the number of clusters in advance, to make sure of getting a correct number of groups, Calinksi criterion is used. [7] The index is defined as

$$\frac{\frac{SSB}{K-1}}{\frac{SSW}{n-K}}$$

where n is the number of observations and K is the number of clusters. SSW is the sum of squares within the clusters while SSB is the sum of squares among the clusters. The index is simply an F(ANOVA) statistic. A K that makes this index a maximum value is selected as the correct number of clusters.

All the procedures are conducted through R with the packages of vegan and labdsv.

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[7]The criterion is known as Calinski-Harabasz (1974) criterion.

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