# Asian Values, Post-Communist Legacies and Generic Influences on Political Trust: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis

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# ASIAN VALUES, POST-COMMUNIST LEGACIES AND GENERIC INFLUENCES

# ON POLITICAL TRUST

## A Substantive and Methodological Analysis

Social science offers both generalizing and particularizing theories to explain political phenomena. Global studies of democratization generalize conclusions by analyzing a handful of aggregate variables from all member states of the United Nations. By contrast, experts in area studies particularize, explaining political developments by reference to such distinctive phenomena as the personality of a leader, the national political culture or Asian values.

Generic political theories employ concepts that can by applied to characterize all cases within a universe. The classificatory schema may be continuous, for example, the percentage voting for the governing party; ordinal, such as the extent to which individuals prefer democracy or dictatorship; or nominal, for example, the ethnic identification of citizens. By contrast, particularistic theories stress concepts that cannot be applied to all political systems because they concern characteristics of a single or limited number of political systems. Any attempt to generalize a particularistic concept, such as Western civilization (Huntington, 1996) results in a 0/1 variable in which other civilizations in Asia, Moslem, African, Orthodox and other countries are all indiscriminately lumped together in a residual category of "non-Western" countries.

Since political trust concerns institutions of government in a particular country, it is logical to hypothesize that trust will be influenced by particular national circumstances. Yet it can also be hypothesized that generic influences tend to override the effect of particular national influences.

> H 1a. <u>Generic variables are the most important influence on political trust.</u>
> (In this paper generic variables include social structure, economic circumstances and political attitudes that can vary between individuals within or across continents, and contextual attributes that vary across countries or continents, such as GDP per capita.
>
> H 1b. <u>Particularistic variables are the most important influences on political trust.</u> (These variables includes attributes of a single country, for example, Russian or Chinese culture, or attitudes only meaningful within a restricted context, such as Asian values or opinion about returning to Communist rule.

Comparative data is necessary to test these hypotheses. Generalizing theories ought to be tested with evidence from countries that differ substantially in particulars of history and values in order to see how much or how little difference is made by cultural context. Stated negatively, one cannot assume that conclusions arrived at from the study of a single national context are generalizable. In a complementary way, one can

only demonstrate the particular distinctiveness of a country by showing how it differs from any other country. For example, to show that America is exceptional one should present evidence of the general norm from which the United States deviates.

Since political trust concerns attitudes of individuals, survey data from a multiplicity of countries should be used to test hypotheses. Moreover, it is important to have questionnaires that provide data about both generic <u>and</u> particularistic influences. The Global Barometer Survey (GBS) Network offers just this type of data. Its questionnaires are a hybrid combining both generic and particularistic measures, because the GBS brings together research networks that have developed multi-country questionnaires in different continental contexts. (<u>www.globalbarometer.org</u>). The New Europe Barometer, since 1991 in 16 post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union); the Latinobarometro, since 1995 in 17 countries of South and Central America; the Afrobarometer, since 1999 in 15 countries of Africa south of the Sahara; and the East Asia Barometer, since 2001 in 8 countries.

Since each Barometer started at a different point in time, and the Afro and Asian Barometers sought cross-continental inputs in the initial construction of their questionnaires, there is a substantial range of generic questions common across dozens of countries. Yet, because each questionnaire is designed to take account of research priorities particular to a continent, each includes sections that are generic within a continent but not necessarily generalizable across continents. For example, because of the importance of the economic transformation in post-Communist Europe the New Europe Barometer devotes far more attention to macro and micro-economic measures than does the World Values Survey. Because of the debate about particular Asian values, the East Asian Barometer has more questions of generic concern across a continent than do electoral studies that must give priority to understanding a particular election outcome in a particular country.

The substantive object of this paper is to test the influence on political trust of generic social economic influences, political attitudes and particularistic values. We draw on the New Europe Barometer because it offers data on the particularistic post-Communist legacy as well as a repertoire of generic indicators, and the East Asian Barometer has many questions that may serve as indicators of particularistic Asian values. Methodologically, limiting the comparison to two continents makes it possible to give careful attention to the inevitable problems of cross-continental comparability that arise, and to some unexpected issues of within-continent comparability too. The data analyzed here comes from representative sample surveys in 11 post-Communist countries--Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Russian Federation--and 8 East Asian countries--mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. The NEB surveys were between June and November, 2001 with 13,010 respondents (<u>www.cspp.strath.ac.uk</u>; Rose, 2002). The East Asian surveys were collected in 2001/2002 from 12,217 respondents. (<u>www.eastasiabarometer.org</u>).

In keeping with the generalizing logic of social science we create a single multi-continental data base containing responses from 25,227 individuals (see Przeworski and Teune, 1971). Doing so avoids the ecological fallacy that arises when

the presentation and analysis of comparative survey data proceeds by concentrating attention on cross-national variations in national responses rather than on variations in response according to generic attributes such as men and women, young and old, or more and less educated. (To control for differences in sample size between countries, we do weight each country's total number of respondents to equal 1,000). Each individual is characterized by four types of attributes: generic individual characteristics and attitudes; generic attributes of their context, such as the trustworthiness or corruption of their regime; particularistic characteristics of individuals, such as their views on questions about Asian values; and particularistic contextual characteristics, such as being a citizen of the Russian Federation. The introduction of contextual as well as individual characteristics avoids what Scheuch (1966) has labelled as the 'individualist fallacy', that is assuming that educated people ought to be more trusting of political institutions, whether or not the institutions are corrupt.

Our first step is to derive a common measure of trust in political institutions across two continents. In addition to the inescapable fact that the language of a question cannot be identical across 19 countries, problems also arise between and even within continents in the coding of responses, recording don't knows, and whether sensitive political questions are asked. Rather than hide these problems under the tatami mat or confine analysis to the very few indicators that are unambiguously identical, such as age and gender, we seek to demonstrate how statistical analysis, here factor analysis, can be used to create a common measure of trust from questions which do not address this concept with identical indicators. We then turn to multiple regression analysis to test in sequence the influence on trust of generic indicators of social structure, economic circumstances and political attitudes. At each step we present regression results separately for East Asia, Post-Communist Europe and the merged 19-country file in order to see whether the same influences operate differently in different continental contexts. The generic variables explain a substantial amount of variation without reference to any particular national or continental influences.

Since generic and particularistic influences need not be mutually exclusive, the final step is to analyze the influence on political trust of particularistic indicators of Asian values, the Communist legacy and being under the Russian or the Chinese government. When this is done, particularistic characteristics of Asians and of post-Communist citizens do not show the strength of generic influences and, when the two sets of influences are combined, generic political and economic influences dominate and particularistic measures are of little importance.

## I   MEASURING POLITICAL TRUST

Political trust is a major contemporary concern to political scientists.   Its presence or absence is deemed to be an important influence on political stability and the effectiveness of government (Pharr and Putnam, 2000).   Robert Putnam's (2000) theory of social capital sees trust as central in <u>Making Democracy Work</u>. National survey evidence of decline in popular trust in government is often interpreted as a warning signal of trouble in the political system. Since new democracies are potentially more vulnerable than long-established regimes, a decline in trust or a rise in distrust is even more worrisome, Given this, survey-oriented political scientists have devoted considerable resources to analyzing the determinants of political trust, and of social

trust more generally. However, Fukuyama (1995) has argued that trust is a function of particular national contexts and emphasized differences in the radius of trust between Asian countries and European countries. Moreover, there is a growing theoretical and empirical literature that challenges the importance of trust for political stability (see e.g. Newton, 1999; Rose and Weller, 2003; Uslaner, 2002).

Trust in political institutions is relevant for maintaining a regime, whether or not it is democratic (Easton, 1965). A battery of questions about trust in institutions is found in Global Barometer surveys on every continent (see www.globalbarometer.org). The East Asian and New Europe Barometer surveys both ask questions about trust in seven politically salient institutions: two are representative institutions (parties and Parliament); three are authoritative (the military, police and the courts); and two relate to media of political communication (newspapers and television). The results show (Table I.1a, 1b):

Major differences in the level of trust between institutions. In East Asia, the mean for trust in the Army is 66 percent as against 35 percent trusting parties. In post-Communist Europe, the range of means is from 47 percent for the Army to 13 percent for parties.

Major differences in the level of trust between countries. In East Asia the seven-country range is between a mean of 58 percent trusting in Thailand and 36 percent in Japan and Taiwan. In New Europe, it is between 37 percent in Romania and 20 percent in Russia.

Mainland China reports an abnormally high level of trust. The data show 95 percent say they have quite a lot or a great deal of trust in the Army, and 94 percent have a great deal of trust in the party, and Chinese respondents rank highest on all institutions. The mean for trust in China is 85 percent, 27 percentage points higher than for the second most trusting country, Thailand.
(Table I.1a, b about here)
While seven institutions are common to both continents, the coding of replies is not identical. The New Europe Barometer scale has seven points, ranging from no trust at all to complete trust; it thus offers a mid-point for people who are sceptical or have no clear opinion about whether an institution is trustworthy. As we have argued elsewhere (Mishler and Rose, 1997), scepticism is both theoretically and practically important, for sceptical or neutral people are open to judge government by what it does rather than blindly trusting or distrusting political institutions. Scepticism is particularly important in newly democratizing countries, where the legacy of the past may encourage distrust while the promise of the future is for a trustworthy government. Across the continent, an average of 21 percent chose the sceptical, neutral option, 4, and an additional 3 percent on average did not make any choice and were classified as don't knows.

The East Asia Barometer offers no mid-point for sceptics; the standard format is an assessment of trust on a 4-point scale ranging from a great deal of trust to none at all. However, only three countries--Korea, Mongolia and the Philippines--kept to this standard. Don't know was offered as an explicit category in four countries: Hong Kong,

18 percent; Taiwan, 14 percent; mainland China, 6 percent; and Japan, 8 percent. In Thailand 10 percent no answer was given, leading respondents to have missing data entered as their reply. In addition, in mainland China 'Not sure' was recorded as the response of 1.3 percent. For these five countries, an average of 12 percent were recorded as giving non-standard answers,[1] as against the three countries where more than 99 percent gave standard answers.

Overall, East Asian countries tend to show a higher level of trust than do post-Communist countries. However, the abnormal results from mainland China, where an average of five-sixths report they trust institutions, much inflates the difference between continents. When mainland China is removed from the calculation of the East Asian average, then a plurality of East Asians distrust government (47 percent), as against 45 percent trusting, and the median 8 percent of respondents offer no opinion. The difference in distrust between the continents is thereby reduced to 6 percentage points. This marginal difference is consistent with a difference between the totalitarian legacy that encouraged distrust in all post-Communist countries, as against a legacy of non-totalitarian authoritarian rule in East Asia (Linz, 2000), and with the better score of East Asian countries on the Transparency International 10-point corruption index (East Asia without China: 5.2; with China, 4.9; NEB countries, 4.1). The difference in positive trust appears large, 22 percent, because of the absence of consistent coding within and between continents, and especially the absence of a sceptical response in East Asia. However, it would be misleading to emphasize contextual influences and differences when comparisons are being made between individuals. The GBS surveys find substantial variation between individuals within countries and within continents, as measured by standard deviations and coefficients of variation (Tables I1a and I.1b).

Notwithstanding coding difference, we can use factor analysis within each continent to resolve a major debate within the literature of trust, whether or not individuals are predisposed to register trust holistically or not. Putnam's (2000) theory predicts that trust is holistically, since trust in other people is projected onto trust in political institutions. But in a regime in transition democrats may be more inclined to trust representative institutions such as parties and parliament rather than the police and army, and authoritarians to discriminate in the opposite direction.

Factor analysis confirms that trust in political institutions is holistic. In East Asia, all five political institutions load substantially on the first factor and the same is true in Post-Communist countries. The five political institutions account for 47 percent of the variance in East Asia and 45 percent in Post-Communist countries (Table I.2 a,b). The only difference between the two continents is in the order in which the institutions rank. In East Asia, parties and Parliament rank first and second, with the three authoritative institutions following. In Post-Communist Europe, authoritative and representative institutions alternate. In both, the second factor combines trust in two civil society institutions, television and the press.

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[1]    . With small percentages of don't knows or missing data taken into account, the total non-standard answers are: Hong Kong, 19 percent; Taiwan, 15 percent; Thailand, 10 percent; Japan, 8 percent; and mainland China, 8 percent.

(Table I.2 a,b about here)

In the pages that follow we define political trust as the first factor score for each respondent for the analyses reported in Tables 1.2a,b. Since the factor score for each respondent has a common statistical metric with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, the factor scores for trust in five political institutions can be used as a common measure across continents, and that constitutes our dependent variable here. In view of differences in coding replies, we undertake and report regression results for each continent separately, and then for the merged 19-country cross-continental data base.


## II   SOCIAL DIFFERENCES OF LIMITED EFFECT

While empirical sociological research usually focuses on a single country, the generic influences, such as class or education or gender, are usually employed to account for divisions within a society. With GBS data, it is possible to test empirically the extent to which generic differences in social structure influence political trust across continents.

H2   If individuals differ in their social characteristics, they will differ in political trust.

Five classic social structure differences are included in both GBS surveys: age, gender, education, religion and marital status. The recording of age and gender is unproblematic. While education is now compulsory in the countries covered here, national education systems differ within as much as between continents in how many levels of education are available and distributed; these differences affect coding of respondents.   Given that there are high and low levels of education in every country, we have assigned national responses to four standard categories: elementary, vocational, academic secondary, and university. Marital status is defined categorically by whether or not the respondent is married or living with a partner. In a European setting, religious commitment can be assessed by asking people how frequently they go to church. Within East Asia there are far greater differences not only between nominal religious affiliations but also participation in religious activities. We code religious participation on a 6-point scale from never to more than once a week.
(Table II.1 about here)

Social structure has a limited influence on the political trust of East Asians, virtually none among new Europeans and thus very little across continents (Table II.1). The contested claims of governments to be trustworthy are reflected in the fact that the more educated people are, the less likely they are to show political trust.   Education is the most important influence both in East Asia and across continents.[2] Older East

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[2]    . The organizers of the East Asian Barometer did not attempt to impose a common class structure on respondents from fragmented island societies such as the Philippines and a Communist "classless" society to modern OECD societies. A uniform class structure is also unsuited to post-Communist societies, since many people are engaged in multiple economies and prestige hierarchies are in the process of being radically transformed. Given the association between education and socio-economic status, it can be regarded as an indicator for this broader concept.

Asians, who are more likely to have experienced a repressive regime than younger people, are significantly less trustful too. The other significant influence is marital status: married people are consistently more likely to be trusting. More detailed analysis of the East Asia data finds that this is associated with a larger number of persons in an extended family household.

The limited influence of generic social structure influences is a caution against attempts to reduce political trust to political sociology. It also leaves open the possibility that the determinants of political trust may be particularistic rather than generic.


## III  MACRO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES MORE IMPORTANT THAN MICRO

The familiar proposition--'It's the economy, stupid'--points to a multiplicity of potential influences, for an economy operates at both macro and micro levels. The macro-context influences opportunities (cf. working in Japan or Thailand) and within a society individuals vary in their personal economic circumstances. The pioneering work of Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) has shown the importance in America of distinguishing between macro-economic influences, such as Gross Domestic Product and micro-economic influences, such as individual evaluations of their personal economic circumstances.

Fiorina (1981) and MacKuen et al. (1992) argue that the time dimension also influences how people evaluate economic conditions. Individuals may be influenced by their evaluation of the current state of the economy, its past record, the change between past and present, and their future expectations. Since structural economic conditions do not show effects in twelve months, both the East Asia and New Europe Barometers ask respondents to evaluate the current state of the macro and micro economies by comparison with five years ago, and to view the future in terms of five years hence, when expectations can show hope or fear.

> H 3 If individuals have a more positive view of economic conditions, they will be more likely to have political trust.

Economic conditions influence trust both within and across continents. The amount of variance explained in East Asia, 24.8 percent, is higher than in Post-Communist Europe, 8.6 percent, but the cross-continental pattern confirms the generality of economic influences, for 11.3 percent of the variance is explained (Table III.1)

(Table III.1 about here)

The economy that matters most is the macro-economy. Consistently, the most important influence is the way that individuals evaluate their current national economy; the evaluation of the national economy in five years is second in importance. These subjective evaluations are much more important than the absolute level of Gross Domestic Product per capita, which is significant but secondary, and links high standards of living with less trust, as is the case in Korea and Japan (Table 1.1a). Household economic conditions are insignificant or negatively signed in East Asia, and in Post-Communist Europe are of secondary importance to national economic

conditions.[3]

The association of national economic conditions with political trust is understandable since governments control a substantial section of the economy and are expected to do so by many citizens. Yet as the next section shows, economic growth can encourage distrust if the state is seen as corrupt in distributing the benefits of economic growth.

## IV   GENERIC POLITICAL VALUES MATTER

To reduce explanations of political trust to economic and sociological causes, without regard to political attitudes is excessively reductionist. So narrow a focus can only be justified after it has been demonstrated empirically that political attitudes, on their own or in combination with other influences, have virtually no statistical influence on trust. The hypothesis that must be nullified to reduce political trust to a byproduct of economic sociology is:
    H 4. Individual differences in generic political values influence political trust.

To avoid reducing political explanation to particularistic phenomena, such as "It's all due to Putin" or "The LDP is unpopular", comparative surveys must concentrate on fundamentals of politics rather than transitory concerns of the media or of psephologists with particular elections. The Barometer surveys have six common measures of generic political evaluations and Transparency International's corruption index adds a contextual measure (Table IV.1). Differences between East Asian and New Europe respondents are limited. With the exception of a consensus about rejecting military rule, differences between individuals within and across countries are found on all generic political indicators. (Table IV.1 and Appendix Table 1).
(Table IV.1 about here)

In new democracies people have lived under both democratic and undemocratic regime; hence, the fundamental form of political competition is between regimes. Before asking people which of several competing parties they might vote for in their national election, a particularistic question par excellence, people can be asked to evaluate their past regime and their current regime. A preference for the current regime (whether or not it is democratic in aspiration or fact) can be expected to increase political trust. Likewise, endorsement of undemocratic alternatives, such as dismissing parliament and elections and bringing in a dictator, may be associated with a lower level of trust in existing political institutions (for an explication of the complexities of such associations, see Mishler and Rose, 2001). In established democracies, party identification is also predicted to be associated with political trust;

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[3]      . Differences in national currencies make a straight comparison of incomes impossible across national boundaries, but it is possible to compare where individuals are placed within a national income distribution. The New Europe Barometer divides respondents into four income quartiles from well above average to poor. East Asia Barometer data can be used for such comparisons in every country but China, where a method appropriate to calculate income in rural areas questions whether it is possible to calculate a national income distribution for China.

hence, party identification or, in the case of the "floating" party systems of post-Communist countries (Rose and Munro, 2003: chapter 4) party preference, is included as a potential influence on trust.

The rule of law is a necessary condition of a regime being fully democratic (Rose and Shin, 2001), and from Prague to Moscow, Seoul and Tokyo corruption is an issue. Two types of generic indicators of corruption--contextual and individual--are included here. A contextual assessment is important insofar as one expects that the more corrupt a regime is, the more likely it is to be distrusted. Transparency International has created a generic Index classifying the extent to which regimes around the world are high in honesty or corrupt as assessed on a common metric by elite observers (see www.transparency.org). The perceptions of corruption by individuals at the grass roots can differ from elite perceptions on which Transparency International tends to rely, and empirical research shows that each has an independent influence on trust (see Mishler and Rose, 2001a).

Political attitudes exert a greater influence on political trust in post-Communist countries (R2: 14.2 percent) than do economic or social structure influences. The more new Europeans see corruption as widespread in their country, the less likely they are to trust political institutions and the higher the Transparency International rating of their government's integrity, the higher the level of trust (Table IV.2). In East Asia the more corrupt the government is perceived, the less likely people are to trust it. While the Transparency International Index also appears to have a substantial influence, the sign is negative. Statistically, the East Asian regression implies that the more honest the government the less it is trusted. This paradoxical or perverse relationship appears due to the abnormal pattern of replies in mainland China. There 54 percent said they had no opinion about corruption whilst 11 percent said there was no corruption, 28 percent said only a few politicians were corrupt, and 7 percent thought most or all corrupt. Moreover, within China there is a clear tendency for the perception of corruption to reduce trust.[4]   When more variables are added (see Table V.1 et seq.,) the anomaly is removed and individual perceptions of corruption and the independent TI rating both influence political trust in the expected direction.
(Table IV.2 about here)

In political systems in transition, people differ in their opinions about alternative regimes. In post-Communist countries, there is an expected and strong association between approval of the current regime and trust in political institutions. However, this relationship has no significance in East Asia. Instead, East Asians who are positive about their old regime are slightly more likely to trust their current political institutions. In both continents those endorsing military rule are more inclined to trust political institutions, including the Army, but they are a very limited minority (cf. Table IV.1 and 2). In post-Communist countries, preference for rule by a dictator rather than elected politicians results in less trust in political institutions, and having a party you are ready

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[4]    . The mean political trust factor score for those who think there is almost no corruption is 1.85; for those who say only a few are corrupt, 1.57; the don't knows, 1.41, and most or all corrupt, 0.99.

to vote for increases political trust. In East Asia, by contrast, neither influence related to electing representatives has any significant influence.


## V   COMBINING GENERIC INFLUENCES

A full test of generic influences on political trust requires regression runs that enter all three sets together, in order to see which are important, net of the influence of others. As would be expected, adding some political, economic and social structure variables increases the total amount of variance explained. However, they are not equally important. A striking feature of the combined regressions is that a majority of the social structure influences fail to register any significant influence in all three runs. Education consistently shows a significant Beta, with more educated people on both continents being more likely to distrust  political institutions. However, the Beta for education is sixth in size in East Asia and in the merged data set, and tied for fourth in post-Communist countries.

(Table V.1 about here)


Political influences are especially strong on post-Communist citizens. Adding ten social and economic influences to a regression model for political trust increases the total variance explained by only 2.0 percentage points, compared to what can be explained by political indicators on their own (cf. Tables IV.2 and V.1). In the combined regression, indicators of corruption are strong and mutually re-enforcing, and so too is the rating of the current regime and of having a party preference. Moreover, when economic indicators must contend with political influences their independent influence is much reduced. Three economic indicators fail to achieve statistical significance in post-Communist citizens, and the Betas for the national economy are among the lowest recorded.


Among East Asians, combining economic and political influences explains 33.7 percent of the total variance in political trust across eight countries. Economic measures are more important.. While the addition of economic influences raises the amount of variance explained by political indicators on their own by 19.8 percentage points, the addition of political indicators adds but 9.9 percentage points, because on its own economic influences explain one-quarter of the variance in political trust in East Asia (cf.Tables III.1, IV.2 and V.1). There is a strong and negative relationship between GDP per capita and political trust: the higher a country's GDP, the less they trust the government. This does not mean that people in low income countries will necessarily trust their government. As James Scott (1990) has shown, those who are consistently poor can be distrustful and evasive of political authority. Among the eight East Asian societies analyzed here, a low material standard of living can be associated with a high and sustained rate of economic growth. In the past this was true of Japan and then Taiwan and Korea; today it is above all true of mainland China. A high rate of economic growth can then encourage trust by encouraging people whose living standards are rising rapidly from a low level to be positive about the state of the national economy today and what it will become in five years.


The influence of corruption on East Asians is strong and properly signed when economic and political influences are combined in a single regression.   All who live under a more honest regime are, net of other influences, more likely to trust political

institutions, and the opposite effect is achieved in societies which have regimes evaluated as corrupt by international observers and by their own citizens.[5]   If a regime has a greater reputation among its citizens for corruption than the international rating by Transparency International suggests is warranted, the two effects will tend to offset each other. Since China is extremely poor by World Bank standards as well as highly corrupt by the standards of Transparency International, in this regression the influence of China's dynamic GDP can exert an influence on Chinese trust opposite to that resulting from the low rating of Transparency International.

When surveys from the two continents are merged, both political and economic influences appear to have similar weight. The variance explained by the combined regression is almost double what each set of indicators explains on its own (cf. Tables III.1, IV.2 and V.1). The two political corruption indicators are each strong and properly signed, and four more political indicators are also significant. Macro-economic influences are independently important, though the Beta for the current economy is less than the Betas for the two corruption indicators.

When the impact of generic influences on trust is calculated by reference to the unstandardized regression coefficients (b values), the importance of political variables is increased, because the b values are larger and operate in the same direction. If an individual were to move from perceiving their government as most corrupt to least and move from the regime rated most corrupt to that most honest by Transparency International , their political trust factor score would rise by around 0.81 points. By contrast, if they were to move from the lowest to the highest rating for both their current and future national economy , the effect on their political trust score would be around 0.84 points.


## VI   WHAT DO PARTICULARISTIC VALUES ADD?
Most of the discussion of Asian values, like that of Communist values during the Cold War era, has been rhetorical; high level abstractions have been mobilized for political ends. Lee Kwan Yew's invocation of particularistic Singapore values (Zakaria, 1994; Kausakian, 1997) is as political as Ronald Reagan's characterization of the Soviet Union as an evil empire. To shift the discussion to social science analysis, we must have empirical measures with prima facie relevance to particularistic values and then see what these values add to the influence of generic values established in previous regression analyses. The statistical benchmark is: particularistic Asian or post-Communist values become important insofar as they can add substantially to the variance in political trust that can be explained by generic influences or show that generic values have little or no influence independent of the predominant influence of particularistic values.

Particularistic Asian values. There is great disagreement among social

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[5]     . The unstandardized regression coefficients (b values) show that, net of all other influences, living in the most honest East Asian system, ---, is likely to increase trust by c. 0.65 of a point on a seven-point factor score, and seeing very little corruption will increase trust by an additional c 0.85 points.

scientists about whether or not there is anything distinctive in the way East Asians view the world. Furthermore, many challenge the assumption of homogeneity in values on a continental scale, given countries as different in their histories and political institutions as China, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand. Yet the readiness of some social scientists to describe societies such as China or Japan in terms of a holistic culture implies, at the least, homogeneity in outlooks within a country.

To bring empirical evidence to bear on the Asian values debate, the East Asia Barometer included many questions about topics that are often cited as examples of Asian values, such as giving priority to the family, showing respect for elders and for hierarchical leaders and group norms as against individual preferences.
Nine questions were grouped under the heading of tradition, and sixteen under three related headings of democratic vs. authoritarian attitudes; ideological cleavages; and beliefs. The extent to which these questions can claim face validity as particularly or uniquely Asian varies greatly. For example, deference to elders can be explicitly related to Asian values, whereas attitudes toward dictatorship are not unique to Asia and questions about state ownership of enterprises address a generic economic issue relevant in established democracies of Western Europe too.

Whatever the questions used as indicators, there should be a high level of agreement among Asians, especially in countries where Asian (or specific national cultural values) are strongest. But there is no consensus among Asians on any of these questions, and on many issues East Asians divide almost evenly (Table VI.1). The pattern for the median question, whether a government checked by the legislature can achieve great things,  shows 45 percent agreeing, 44 percent disagreeing and the median group, 11 percent, are don't knows.  Of the 25 questions, there is only one--putting family interests first--where more than three-quarters agree, and one other shows a negative consensus in rejection of traditional values; only 21 percent think that men will lose face if their boss is a woman.
(Table VI.1   Asian values here)

Divisions about values are normal at the national level too. If consensus is defined as more than three-quarters of respondents endorsing a value, then Japanese and Koreans fail to show a consensus on any of the 25 questions and on 24 questions in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Philippines. Relatively speaking, Thailand shows the most consensus; there 9 questions produce agreement among more than three-quarters of Thais and 16 do not.

The sub-headings of the East Asia Barometer questionnaire imply that many questions provide multiple indicators of underlying values, and this is confirmed by factor analysis. Six factors exceed the minimum criterion for coherence, an eigen value of 1.00; cumulatively, they account for 45 percent of the variance across all the questions (Table VI.2). For ease in exposition, we try to select a leading indicator of Asian values from each factor.

(Table VI.2 about here: factor analysis)

The overlap between Asian values and values relevant across continents is evident in the indicators loading highly. Therefore, we select as the leading indicator

for each factor the highest loading question that appears most "Asian". Where there is no question that meets this criterion, as is the case with factor three, where the leading variables refer to institutions of government found on all continents, no indicator is selected. For the first factor a concern with the harmony of the group is the selected indicator, since a desire to maintain national identity against other countries could equally be expressed by Jacques Chirac or Tony Blair. The indicator from the fourth factor concerns the dominance of the oldest woman over the wife in an extended family. A refusal to insist on one's opinion vis a vis co-workers is the lead indicator on the fifth factor, and a preference for educated people to have as much say in government as uneducated people is the fifth Asian values indicator.

When tested on their own, Asian values appear to have some influence on political trust (Table VI.3 about here). Together, the five indicators selected above explain 7.2 percent of the variance in political trust. Those who believe government leaders are like the head of a family, that individuals should sacrifice for society, that a son should back his mother against his wife and that dividing society into groups threatens harmony are more likely to show political trust (Table VI.3). On their own, generic political values explain almost twice as much as particular Asian values. In effect, the addition of notionally Asian values increases the total variance explained by only 3.6 percentage points (cf. Tables VI.3 and IV.2). The most important influences on political trust are the two generic measures of corruption.
(Table VI.3 about here)

Nor are Asian values important through links to social or economic groups. When generic social and economic influences are added to the regression equation, only two notionally Asian values remain statistically significant. Political and economic influences once again dominate the determination of political trust.

Post-Communist values.   For more than 40 years the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were subjected to Communist regimes formulated according to a single template, that of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Communist regimes were totalitarian in aspiration, being concerned not only with how people behaved but also with what people thought. Thus, we would expect the Communist legacy to show a greater homogeneity in political values than in East Asia, where there is no legacy from a single central source and far greater differences in twentieth century history and even more in earlier times, and this case has been argued by many Soviet and post-Soviet area specialists (see e.g. Bunce, 1993).

The most pervasive particularistic features of a Communist regime were materialist: the non-market command economy devalued money as a medium of valuing and allocating services and substituted bureaucratic commands and favours that bent or broke the rules (Kornai, 1992). In the early days of the transition from plan to market, the NEB included questions to measure the particular and pathological legacy of that economy, such as the number of hours each day a person spent queuing for goods that were in short supply (see Rose, 1993). A decade later, when the market has had a pervasive though far from complete influence, such questions are hardly appropriate.[6]

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[6]       . The New Europe Barometer also developed generic new questions to measure

A particularistic measure of regime competition is whether or not post-Communist citizens would welcome the return of a Communist regime. Across 11 countries 21 percent said they would welcome this; excluding Russia the minority is still 18 percent.  Given the one-party nature of Communist rule, another particularistic question asked whether people think government should be in the hands of the best people only or should reflect competition between parties reflecting social, economic and political differences of opinion. A total of -- percent endorse government without party competition.
(Table VI.4 about here)

In a regression analysis, the two attitudes that are a legacy of Communism are statistically significant: those who want a return to Communist rule or the best people to govern are less trusting of current political institutions (Table VI.4). However, they are substantively unimportant together explaining only 1.7 percent of the variance in political trust. Once generic political values are introduced, the two particularistic values are reduced to insignificance and the total amount of variance explained rises to 14.2 percent exactly the same as in their absence (cf Table IV.2). The slight influence of particularistic values is also shown by the failure of attitudes to former Communist regime to achieve statistical significance.  When social and economic influences are added, the pre-eminence of generic political values is underscored yet again, for these non-political influences add only 2.0 percent to the total variance explained.

Particularizing contexts  Much of the theorizing about Asian or Communist values has been carried on at a level of generalization comparable to Samuel Huntington's assertions about conflicts between civilizational values. Yet civilizations are constructed according to intellectual, ideological or partisan criteria, and the unreliability of the categories employed quickly becomes evident in any attempt to assign countries to the category of Islamic civilizations shows, because a high proportion of Muslims live in countries where they constitute a fraction rather than the dominant majority of the population (see Rose, 2002a).

If civilizational values are to become more than an intellectual construct, they must be brought down to earth and shown as evident in the minds of people who live within these civilizations. The Global Barometer Survey makes it possible to determine whether or not this is the case. The results evoke T.H. Huxley's epigram about the tragedy of society: an interesting idea slaughtered by brute facts. When a regression is run in which the independent variable is whether a person lives in East Asia or post-Communist Europe, it explains only 0.1 percent of the variance in political trust. Throughout the Cold War an alternative classification was employed, juxtaposing Communist civilization against other civilizations. This moves respondents in China to the Communist category.  Yet it scarcely alters the result: the variance explained is only 1.2 percent. In short, gross civilizational categories are far too gross (and

how people responded to the regime change, for example, whether or not they have perceived gains in freedom. These questions have now been asked in the   East Asian and Afrobarometers too (www.globalbarometer.org).

contested) to explain individual differences in such basic values as political trust.

The literature of political culture is much more particular than Huntington in both senses of that word, postulating that national political cultures are important determinants of basic political values. The historical experiences and institutional norms of a society are transmitted through inter-generational socialization to create a consensus about values and beliefs maintaining stable government (cf. Easton, 1965). However, this model is far more appropriate for established Western democracies than for most countries studied here, because their political regimes and even state boundaries have changed one or more times within the memory of many citizens. However, when the holistic intellectual construct of political culture is examined empirically through survey research, the results regularly show divisions of opinion within every national society: the only difference is the degree to which citizens differ.In <u>The Civic Culture</u> Almond and Verba (1963) interpret such divisions as demonstrating the desirability of a "mix" of values within a national political culture.

Generic social science theories take differences of opinion for granted. Explanations for within-nation differences are offered in generic terms about the influence of an individual's economic condition, evaluation of government performance and social characteristics such as education. These explanations can be applied not only within a country (a practice consistent with descriptions of sub-cultures) but also across national boundaries, across continents and civilizations. Yet the more general the model, the greater the opportunity it offers to introduce particularizing characteristics as <u>intervening</u> variables. The existence of a multi-continental Global Barometer data base is especially open to this. Whereas the simple Przeworski-Teune model encourages disregarding context, our approach offers a multi-level model in which individual characteristics are the starting point, and particularistic influences, whether of generic context or individual cultures, are integral parts. Doing so avoids the individualist fallacy of assuming that particular contextual influences are of no importance.

Analytically, the question is: <u>What additional explanatory strength is gained by adding particularistic contextual variables to a generic model of individual political outlooks?</u>    Previous sections of this paper have established a base line for measuring the value added by particularistic influences. Across East Asian countries, a model of political trust that relies solely on generic influences can explain 33.7 percent of the variance in individual attitudes. Across eleven post-Communist countries, a generic model of political trust can explain 16.8 percent of individual variance in trust. When the two continental data sets are merged to analyze respondents from 19 countries solely in terms of their generic characteristics, then 19.4 percent of the variance can be explained without invoking a single influence particular to a national culture.

The standard statistical method for taking into account the particularistic influence of national culture is to treat each culture as a 0/1 dummy variable. However, when 19 countries are under scrutiny, this lacks a credible theoretical justification, except the *gestalt* assertion that every country is unique. If almost a score of dummy variables were added, many would be statistically insignificant and others would create distracting statistical "nose" by scraping over the significance barrier because of the

low significance criterion in a pool of 19,000 plus cases. Even if 18 dummy variables each raised the amount of variance explained by 18 percent points because each contributed one percent to that total, it achieved this increase by directing attention at a very large number of secondary or tertiary intervening influences on political trust.

The fundamental theoretical requirement is to specify what it is about a country or a national culture that is particularly distinctive. Is it its wealth (e.g. Japan)? The honesty of its administration (Singapore?) Thousands of years of history and tradition (Chinese in the People's Republic of China and arguably, Hong Kong and Taiwan?) or exposure to totalitarian rule (Stalinism in Russia or the Cultural Revolution in China?) The fatal flaw of a dummy variable is that it is mute: it cannot specify what in particular makes a country unique. Even when it shows a substantial impact, a dummy variable invites the question: What is it about that country that produces such an effect on trust or whatever the dependent variable is? To ignore this stimulus to dig deeper is to reduce a dummy variable to little more than a statistical mechanism for distributing the variance explained by the error term into additional categories.

Multiple definitions about what makes a national culture different imply multiple hypotheses and indicators in order to test each culture. But if each interpretation of distinctiveness is expressed in idiographic terms, then multiple 0/1 variables would be destructive. The good news is that this is not the case, for many interpretations of dummy variables in fact refer to generic influences. For example, the standard of living is frequently used to characterize "poor" China or "rich" Japan. Moreover, characterizations as poor or rich, while formally nominal, are supported by generic evidence, World Bank or UN statistics, which measure poverty or riches as a continuous generic variable, Gross Domestic Product per capita, on which every country in the international system can be placed. To call a single national government corrupt or honest likewise invokes a generic concept that is applied to a hundred countries or more by Transparency International. Preceding sections have shown that both GDP and the government's rating on a corruption index are significant generic influences on individual political trust.

Yet after accepting the importance of generic influences across many countries, there remains the possibility that one or more countries deviate from the general trend. For example, amongst generalizations about political stability within Western Europe Northern Ireland is a deviant case, and Bosnia is a deviant case in post-Communist transitions within Central and Eastern Europe. In this study, two countries--Russia and China--can claim to deviate from generic norms. In their respective continents, each has been in the vanguard in applying Marxist-Leninist doctrines to create a new type of polity and economy and each has consciously used political power to these ends. In addition, their unique historical position as hegemonic countries within their continent adds to the claim for exceptional treatment--and Russian historians and Sinologists assume this too. Hence, it is theoretically justifiable to recognize the distinctiveness of each country in a regression analysis in which dummy variables are assigned to Russian and Chinese respondents respectively.
(Table VI.5 about here)

Living in China or in Russia does have an influence on political trust. Whereas particular Asian values add little to the variance explained by generic influences on

political trust, the inclusion of a dummy for the People's Republic of China increases the variance explained among East Asian respondents by almost 12 percentage points (Tables VI.5, 6).[7]   After taking all generic influences into account and particularistic attitudes, living in the Russian Federation has a significant but slight negative influence on trust, but the increase in total variance explained is only 0.7 of a percentage point. When the respondents from two continents are merged, the greater influence of the Chinese context is maintained. The total amount of variance is increased by one-third and the Beta for China is five times that for Russia.
(Table VI.6 about here)

The particular impact on individual Chinese and Russians is substantial and in opposite directions. Net of all other influences, in the merged regression Chinese are likely have a political trust factor score 1.4 points higher than respondents in other countries, while Russians are likely to have a trust score that is a quarter point lower than respondents in other countries. However, the impact of living in the Russian Federation is much less than the combined influence of indicators of corruption, as measured by Transparency International and perceptions of corruption at individual level.

Statistically, the great positive influence on trust registered by introducing China as a dummy variable is to be expected, since respondents in mainland China consistently showed much more trust in their political institutions than did citizens of any of the other 18 countries examined here (Appendix Tables 2 and 3). Whilst the low level of Russian trust is consistent with aggregate Transparency International and Freedom House rankings and ethnographic literature too, the high level of Chinese trust is inconsistent with such rankings (see e.g. Shi, 1997). **POSSIBLE** interpretations include:
a. Extraordinary economic growth makes Chinese trusting.
b. China tends to be more like Singapore than Russia.
c. Chinese have responded differently to trust questions than have other East Asians.                                          AND
d.   ---------------------------------------------
**Alternative Testable Hypotheses and Interpretations Welcome**

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[7]     . An alternative argument could be made to treat Japan as particularly distinctive. However, when Japan was substituted for China in a merged regression run, it was totally without statistical significance.

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TABLES

Table 1.1A Asian Trust in Political Institutions

*Q. I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. quite a lot of trust, not very much trust or none at all.*

| | Television | Army | Courts | Police | News-papers | Parlia-ment | Parties | Country mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (% trusting quite a lot or a great deal) | | | | | |
| China | 84 | 95 | 72 | 77 | (13) | 86 | 94 | 74 |
| Thailand | 76 | 76 | 58 | 56 | 51 | 55 | 47 | 60 |
| Mongolia | 79 | 65 | 45 | 47 | 42 | 57 | 39 | 53 |
| Hongkong | 61 | 62 | 70 | na | na | 52 | 22 | 53 |
| Philipp | 64 | 54 | 50 | 46 | 54 | 44 | 35 | 50 |
| Korea | 76 | 59 | 51 | 50 | 75 | 15 | 15 | 49 |
| Japan | 52 | 48 | 61 | 49 | 67 | 13 | 9 | 43 |
| Taiwan | 43 | 58 | 41 | 45 | 33 | 19 | 16 | 37 |
| East Asia mean | 67 | 65 | 56 | 53 | 48 | 43 | 35 | 52 |
| Std. deviation | 65 | 15 | 11 | 11 | 21 | 25 | 27 | 25 |
| Coefficient of | .97 | .23 | .20 | .21 | .44 | .59 | .79 | .48 |

Source: East Asia Barometer 2001/2002 (www.eastasiabarometer.org). Total unweighted N=12,217.
Figure in parentheses subject to query.

Table 1.1B    Post-Communist Trust in Political Institutions

Q. *To what extent do you trust each of these political institutions to look after your interests?  Please indicate on a scale with 1 for no trust at all and 7 great trust.*

| | Television | Army | News-papers | Police | Courts | Parlia-ment | Parties | Country mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (percent positive, scores 5 to 7) | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 41 | 39 | 37 | 40 | 34 | 20 | 22 | 33 |
| Czech Republic | 44 | 60 | 34 | 36 | 25 | 20 | 9 | 32 |
| Slovakia | 67 | 35 | 62 | 26 | 16 | 9 | 8 | 32 |
| Hungary | 39 | 43 | 32 | 31 | 24 | 26 | 25 | 31 |
| Poland | 47 | 62 | 26 | 24 | 19 | 13 | 9 | 29 |
| Romania | 51 | 34 | 40 | 27 | 24 | 8 | 7 | 28 |
| Slovenia | 30 | 37 | 22 | 29 | 36 | 16 | 14 | 26 |
| Estonia | 47 | 39 | 39 | 21 | 15 | 9 | 9 | 25 |
| Latvia | 37 | 38 | 27 | 19 | 26 | 10 | 8 | 24 |
| Lithuania | 31 | 30 | 28 | 30 | 26 | 10 | 8 | 23 |
| Russia | 29 | 34 | 25 | 13 | 23 | 7 | 7 | 20 |
| NEB mean | 42 | 41 | 34 | 27 | 24 | 14 | 11 | 28 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Std. deviation | 11 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 |
| Coefficient of variation | .26 | .25 | .32 | .28 | .26 | .45 | .55 | .26 |

Source: New Europe Barometer 2001 (www.cspp.strath.ac.uk and Rose, 2002).   Total unweighted N=13,010.

22

Table I.2A   Factor Analysis of Asian Trust

| *Factor loadings (rotated varimax solution)* | 1 Political Inst. | 2 Media |
|---|---|---|
| Political Parties | .85 | .10 |
| Parliament | .83 | .13 |
| Army | .74 | .19 |
| Police | .61 | .32 |
| Courts | .54 | .28 |
| Newspapers | .15 | .87 |
| Television | .23 | .81 |
| Eigen Value: | 3.31 | 1.06 |
| Variance Explained: | 47.3% | 15.1% |

Source: As in Table I.1A. For details of indicators, see Table I.1A

Table I.2B   Factor Analysis of Post-Communist Trust

| *Factor loadings (rotated varimax solution)* | 1 Political Inst. | 2 Media |
|---|---|---|
| Courts | .78 | .11 |
| Parliament | .76 | .11 |
| Police | .76 | .17 |
| Political Parties | .74 | .12 |
| Army | .54 | .22 |
| Television | .18 | .92 |
| Newspapers | .17 | .92 |
| Eigen Value: | 3.17 | 1.30 |
| Variance Explained: | 45.4% | 18.6% |

Source: As in Table I.1B. For details of indicators, see Table I.1B.

23

Table II.1    THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

|  | E Asia (7.2%) | Post-Comm (4%) | Merged (1.6%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| (R$^2$) | Beta | Beta | Beta |
| Education | -14 | n.s. | -10 |
| Age | -06 | n.s. | n.s. |
| Married | 10 | 05 | 08 |
| Sex: female | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| Religious attendance | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |

N.s.   In view of the very large sample size, all variables that fail to attain the .000 level are classified as not significant.

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

24

Table III. 1  ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL TRUST

| (R²) | E Asia (24.8%) Beta | Post-Comm (8.6%) Beta | Merged (11.3%) Beta |
|---|---|---|---|
| National economy | | | |
| Today | 36 | 14 | 20 |
| In 5 years | 20 | 11 | 13 |
| GDP per capita | -07 | 05 | -06 |
| Household economy | | | |
| Today | -04 | 08 | 09 |
| In 5 years | n.s. | -06 | -06 |

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

Table IV.1 Generic Political Attitudes by Continent

| | East Asia | NEB |
|---|---|---|
| | (Percent) | |
| Q. Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. Where would you place our country on this scale during the period of [name the most recent government under authoritarian rule] | | |
| Rates former regime above midpoint | 25 | 59 |
| Q. On a scale where 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy, where would you place the country under the present government? | | |
| Rates present regime above midpoint | 64 | 59 |
| Identifies with political party | 37 | 35 |
| Q. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government? | | |
| Most, almost everyone corrupt | 52 | 71 |
| Q. We should get rid of parliament and elections and let a strong leader decide | | |
| Strongly, somewhat agree | 23 | 30 |
| Q. The military should govern the country | | |
| Strongly, somewhat agree | 15 | 6 |
| Transparency International index: mean score | 5 | 4.1 |

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

26

Table IV.2   THE INFLUENCE OF GENERIC POLITICAL INDICATORS

| (R²) | E Asia (13.9%) | Post-Comm (14.2%) | Merged (10.3%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Beta* | *Beta* | *Beta* |
| Sees governors as corrupt | -26 | -19 | -22 |
| Transparency Intl index | -19 | 08 | -04 |
| Pro former political regime | 07 | n.s. | 03 |
| Pro current political regime | n.s. | 21 | 16 |
| Prefer dictator | n.s. | -07 | -05 |
| Army should rule | 13 | 05 | 08 |
| Party identification | n.s. | 11 | 07 |

Source: As in Tables I.1A and I.1B

27

Table V.1   COMBINING GENERIC INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL TRUST

| (R²) | East Asia (33.7%) Beta Beta | NEB (16.2%) Beta | Merged (19.4%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Social structure** | | | |
| Education | -11 | -07 | -08 |
| Married | 06 | 04. | 04 |
| Religious attendance | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| Age | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| Sex: female | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| **Economic conditions** | | | |
| National economy today | 30 | 05 | 15 |
| National economy in 5 years | 17 | 07 | 12 |
| GDP per capita | -26 | n.s. | -22 |
| Household economy today | n.s. | 06 | 06 |
| Household economy in 5 years | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| **Political** | | | |
| Sees governors as corrupt | -19 | -18 | -19 |
| Transparency Intl index | 24 | 07 | 19 |
| Prefer dictator without election | n.s. | -07 | -07 |
| Army should rule | 09 | 05 | 08 |
| Pro former regime | 05 | n.s. | n.s |
| Pro current regime | n.s. | 14 | 06 |
| Party identification | n.s. | 10 | 06 |

n.s.:   not statistically significant at the .000 level.

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

Table VI.1   NO CONSENSUS AMONGST ASIANS ABOUT VALUES

| | Agree | Disagree | DK/NA | Range | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | (Percent respondents) | | | | |
| Family interests before individual interests | 79 | 18 | 3 | 68 Japan | 88 Thailand |
| Country should follow own path | 74 | 17 | 9 | 54 Korea | 95 Thailand |
| Elders should mediate in disputes | 62 | 35 | 3 | 34 Hong Kong | 77 Thailand |
| Best to accommodate in dispute with neighbor | 61 | 35 | 4 | 44 Taiwan | 79 Mongolia |
| Individual should sacrifice for society | 60 | 35 | 5 | 16 Japan | 96 Thailand |
| Diverse views create chaos | 60 | 34 | 6 | 47 Korea | 76 Thailand |
| Govt should keep state enterprises | 58 | 33 | 9 | 39 Taiwan | 85 Thailand |
| Don't insist own opinion against co-workers' | 57 | 37 | 6 | 43 China | 69 Mongolia |
| Groups threaten harmony | 56 | 36 | 8 | 35 Korea | 84 Thailand |
| Moral political leaders should decide | 51 | 44 | 5 | 28 Japan | 76 Thailand |
| National govt should centralize power | 51 | 39 | 10 | 22 Japan | 81 Thailand |
| Leaders should not compromise | 45 | 47 | 8 | 31 Korea | 80 Mongolia |
| Govt checked by legislature cannot achieve | 45 | 44 | 11 | 30 Japan | 61 Mongolia |
| Governors like head of a family | 44 | 51 | 5 | 13 Japan | 68 Mongolia |
| Govt decides what can be discussed | 43 | 47 | 10 | 23 Japan | 76 Mongolia |
| Leaders should ignore minority views | 39 | 53 | 8 | 13 Japan | 54 Mongolia |
| Judges should defer to executive | 39 | 51 | 9 | 20 Japan | 61 Philippines |
| Children should obey unreasonable parents | 38 | 60 | 2 | 22 Hong Kong | 69 Mongolia |
| Wives should obey their mothers-in-law | 36 | 59 | 5 | 21 Japan | 50 China |
| Success depends on fate | 36 | 61 | 2 | 25 Japan | 55 Philippines |
| Relatives should be hired first | 35 | 59 | 6 | 26 Korea | 65 Mongolia |
| Leaders can ignore procedures | 31 | 60 | 9 | 14 Hong Kong | 58 Mongolia |
| Leaders should not tolerate opposing views | 29 | 59 | 12 | 7 Thailand | 73 Japan |
| Uneducated should have as much say | 25 | 71 | 4 | 7 China | 85 Thailand |
| Men lose face under female boss | 21 | 75 | 4 | 7 Hong Kong | 47 Thailand |

Source: As in Table I.1A

29

Table VI.2. SIX DIMENSIONS OF VALUES: FACTOR ANALYSIS

*Factor loadings (rotated varimax solution)*

| | F 1 | F 2 | F 3 | F 4 | F 5 | F6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country should follow own path | -.67 | .00 | .09 | -.04 | -.19 | .02 |
| Groups threaten harmony | .58 | -.01 | .35 | .01 | .12 | .06 |
| Govt should keep state enterprises | .57 | .19 | .09 | .11 | -.02 | -.08 |
| Diverse views create chaos | .54 | .06 | .42 | .00 | .14 | .19 |
| National govt should centralize power | .45 | .24 | .33 | .13 | -.05 | -.23 |
| Leaders should ignore minority views | -.09 | .68 | .15 | .10 | -.06 | .08 |
| Leaders should not tolerate opposing views | .36 | .53 | -.16 | .00 | .13 | -.20 |
| Governors like head of family | .04 | .51 | .36 | .13 | .27 | -.03 |
| Individual should sacrifice for society | .35 | .47 | .00 | .04 | .20 | -.39 |
| Leaders can ignore procedures | .20 | .43 | .26 | .18 | -.01 | .16 |
| Moral political leaders should decide | .18 | .42 | .26 | .06 | .33 | -.02 |
| Judges should defer to executive | .12 | .10 | .60 | .10 | .01 | -.32 |
| Govt checked by legislature cannot achieve | .13 | .14 | .59 | -.01 | .04 | .13 |
| Govt decides what can be discussed | .06 | .36 | .48 | .05 | .19 | .14 |
| Wives should obey their mothers-in-law | -.02 | .05 | .08 | .61 | -.01 | -.18 |
| Children should obey unreasonable parents | .07 | .12 | -.07 | .61 | .15 | .33 |
| Men lose face under female boss | .06 | .03 | .13 | .60 | -.01 | -.19 |
| Relatives should be hired first | .15 | .14 | -.05 | .60 | .06 | .22 |
| Don't insist on own opinion against coworkers' | .03 | .00 | .15 | -.04 | .63 | .04 |
| Family interests come before individual interests | .28 | .14 | -.09 | -.08 | .57 | -.14 |
| Best to accommodate in dispute with neighbor | .00 | .07 | -.05 | .20 | .52 | .36 |
| Elders should mediate in disputes | .26 | .01 | .14 | .28 | .43 | -.09 |
| Success depends on fate | -.12 | .01 | .34 | .36 | .36 | -.12 |
| Uneducated should have as much say as educated | .11 | .09 | .01 | .09 | -.03 | -.66 |
| Leaders should not compromise | .15 | .39 | .16 | .04 | -.09 | .53 |
| Eigen Value: | 4.53 | 1.75 | 1.47 | 1.38 | 1.12 | 1.04 |
| Variance Explained: | 18.1% | 7.0% | 5.9% | 5.5% | 4.5% | 4.1% |

Source: As in Table I.1A

30

Table VI.3    WHAT ASIAN VALUES ADD TO GENERIC INFLUENCES

| (R²) | Asian (7.2%) | Pol values (17.5%) | All (34.6%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asian values | *Beta* | *Beta* | *Beta* |
| Governors like head of family | 20 | 14 | 07 |
| Wives should obey mother-in-law | 14 | 08 | 07 |
| Groups threaten harmony | 08 | 07 | n.s. |
| Uneducated should have as much say | n.s. | 04 | n.s. |
| Don't insist own opinion | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| | | | |
| Generic political values | | | |
| See governors as corrupt | - | -25 | -18 |
| Transparency Intl index | - | -16 | 23 |
| Pro former regime | - | 06 | 05 |
| Army should rule | - | 10 | 08 |
| Prefer dictator | - | n.s. | -04 |
| | | | |
| Economic conditions | | | |
| National economy today | - | - | 29 |
| National economy in 5 years | - | - | 17 |
| GDP per capita | - | - | -24 |
| | | | |
| Social structure | | | |
| Education | - | - | -09 |
| Married | - | - | 06 |

(Variables insignificant in all runs are omitted)

Source: As in Table I.1A and I.1B

Table VI.4    GENERIC VALUES DOMINATE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

| (R$^2$) | Post-Comm (1.7%) | Pol values (14.2%) | All (16.2%) |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | *Beta* | *Beta* | *Beta* |
| <u>Post-Communist values</u> |  |  |  |
| Prefer return Comm. regime | -09 | n.s. | n.s. |
| Govt by only the best people | -08 | n.s. | n.s. |
|  |  |  |  |
| <u>Generic political values</u> |  |  |  |
| Sees governors as corrupt | - | -19 | -18 |
| Transparency Intl index | - | 08 | 07 |
| Pro current regime | - | 21 | 14 |
| Prefer dictator | - | -06 | -07 |
| Army rule | - | 05 | 05 |
| Party identification | - | 11 | 10 |
|  |  |  |  |
| <u>Economic conditions</u> |  |  |  |
| National economy today | - | - | 05 |
| National economy in 5 years | - | - | 07 |
| Household economy today | - | - | 06 |
|  |  |  |  |
| <u>Social structure</u> |  |  |  |
| Education | - | - | -07 |
| Sex: female | - | - | 04 |
| (Variables insignificant in all runs are omitted) |  |  |  |

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

Table VI.5    GENERIC INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL TRUST ACROSS CONTINENTS

| | East Asia | Post-Comm | Merged |
|---|---|---|---|
| (R²) | 46.5% | 16.9% | 25.5% |
| | *(Betas of significant variables only)* | | |
| <u>Generic political values</u> | | | |
| Sees governors as corrupt | -14 | -20 | -18 |
| Transparency Intl index | 29 | n.s. | 14 |
| Prefer dictator | n.s. | -06 | -05 |
| Army rule | 04 | 05 | 06 |
| Party identification | n.s. | 09 | 06 |
| Pro former regime | 04 | n.s. | n.s. |
| Pro current regime | 09 | 14 | 12 |
| | | | |
| <u>Economic</u> | | | |
| National economy today | 15 | 05 | 09 |
| National economy in 5 years | 09 | 07 | 09 |
| GDP per capita | -19 | n.s. | -12 |
| Household economy today | n.s. | 06 | 06 |
| Household economy in 5 years | -03 | n.s. | n.s. |
| | | | |
| <u>Social</u> | | | |
| Education | -09 | -06 | -08 |
| Sex: female | 04 | 04 | n.s. |
| Married | n.s. | 03 | n.s. |
| | | | |
| <u>Particularistic context</u> | | | |
| China | 44 | n.s. | 27 |
| Russia | n.s. | -11 | -05 |
| | | | |
| <u>Particularistic values</u> | | | |
| Governors like head family | 10 | n.s. | n.s. |
| Uneducated people have say | -05 | n.s. | n.s. |

Source: As in Tables I.1A & I.1B

Table VI.6    WHAT PARTICULAR VARIABLES ADD TO GENERIC
INFLUENCES

|  | East Asia | Post-Comm | Merged |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | *(% variance explained in political trust)* | | |
| Generic influences | 33.7 | 16.2 | 19.4 |
| Particular values add | +0.9 | 0.0 | NA |
| PRC/Russia dummy adds | +11.9 | +0.7 | +6.1 |
|  | ----- | ---- | ----- |
| TotalR$^2$ | 46.5 | 16.9 | 25.5 |

Source: Tables V.1, VI.3, 4 and 5.

Appendix. VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS

| | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Dev. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trust in 5 political institutions: factor score | -3.03 | 4.45 | -0.04 | 1.08 |
| Sex | 1 Male | 2 Female | 1.52 | 0.50 |
| Age | 18 | 95 | 44.82 | 16.62 |
| Education | 1 Element. | 4 Univ. | 2.32 | 1.05 |
| Religious attendance | 0 Never | 5 >once/week | 2.54 | 2.00 |
| Married or cohabiting | 0 No | 1 Yes | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| National economy today[1] | -100 worst | 100 best | -9.94 | 54.14 |
| National economy in 5 years[2] | -100 worst | 100 best | 19.02 | 49.43 |
| Household economy in 5 years | 1 Much worse | 5 Much better | 2.78 | 0.95 |
| Household economy today | 1 Very dissat | 4 Very sat | 2.31 | 0.71 |
| GDP per capita purchasing power adjusted | 1610 | 26755 | 11556 | 6630 |
| Pro former political regime[3] | 1 worst | 10 best | 5.47 | 2.88 |
| Pro current political regime[4] | 1 worst | 10 best | 6.34 | 2.36 |
| Party identification[5] | 0 No | 1 Yes | 0.64 | 0.48 |
| Individual sees governors as corrupt | 1 Almost none | 4 Almost all corrupt | 2.83 | 0.82 |
| Transparency International Corruption Index | 2.3 Corrupt | 8.2 Very honest | 4.43 | 1.50 |
| Prefer dictator without elections | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 1.94 | 0.97 |
| Army should rule the country | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 1.51 | 0.74 |
| Governors like head of family | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.43 | 0.85 |
| Groups threaten harmony | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.70 | 0.86 |
| Uneducated people should have as much say | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.82 | 0.88 |
| Wives should obey their mothers-in-law | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.22 | 0.88 |
| Don't insist own opinion against co-workers' | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.67 | 0.82 |
| Government should be in the hands of the best people | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 2.66 | 1.06 |
| Prefer return to Communist regime | 1 Disagree++ | 4 Agree++ | 1.73 | 0.94 |
| Russia | 0 No | 1 Yes | 0.09 | 0.29 |
| People's Republic of China | 0 No | 1 Yes | 0.12 | 0.33 |

Notes:

[1] East Asians were asked to rate the overall economic condition of the country on a scale from 1 Very good to 5 Very bad. These replies were recoded to match the New Europe Barometer scale from -100 (worst) to +100 (best).

[2] As for current economic condition.

[3] East Asians were asked to rate the extent to which their former regime was a democracy on a 1 to 10 scale; New Europeans were asked to rate their former regime from -100 (worst) to +100 (best); both scales were standardized on a 1 (worst, least democratic) to 10 (best, most democratic) scale.

[4] As for former regime.

[5] Respondents who could name a party they felt close to (East Asia) or would vote for (New Europe) are classified as identifying. The question was not asked in mainland China.