



A Comparative Survey of

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The Youth's Evaluation of Quality of  
Governance in East Asia

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## **Asian Barometer**

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

# **Working Paper Series**

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# The Youth's Evaluation of Quality of Governance in East Asia

Chong-Min Park

In this paper we examine how young people in East Asia view the quality of democratic governance in their countries and how their view differs from that of older age cohorts. Moreover, we explore whether the youth's view differs with their different life circumstances or social experiences associated with gender, education, place of residence, family income or internet use. Since democratic governance is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, prior research tends to distinguish between its dimensions and assess regime performance on each dimension separately (Lijphart 1999; Altman and Perez-Linan 2002; Fowleraker and Krznaric 2000; Diamond and Morlino 2004). Following this line of research, we select four key dimensions of democratic governance – freedom, accountability, rule of law and responsiveness - and examine how the youth of East Asia perceive the quality of democratic governance in their countries.

## **Freedom**

The extent of freedom is one of the key yardsticks by which quality of democratic governance can be measured. We focus on two civil liberties - freedom of speech and freedom of association. If any assessment of democratic quality is to be made in terms of its content, it should include the provision of freedom because it constitutes the ultimate goals of democracy along with equality. How do the East Asian youth view the extent of both freedoms in their countries?

### *Freedom of speech*

The ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “People are free to speak what they think without fear.” Responses of “strongly agree” or “agree” indicate favorable evaluation of freedom of speech. Table 1 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan and South Korea the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. In both liberal democracies about two in five young people (44% for Japan and 42% for South Korea) agreed with the statement. Unlike their counterparts in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, young Taiwanese were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. About seven in ten agreed with the statement.

In Indonesia the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults: more than four in five young Indonesians agreed with the statement. By contrast, in three other electoral democracies such as Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among their youth varied from a low of 56 percent in Mongolia to 83 percent in Thailand.

In Malaysia the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Nonetheless, about four in five young Malaysians agreed with the statement. Unlike their counterparts in Malaysia, the Singaporean youth were somewhat less favorable from older age cohorts. Only about two in five young Singaporeans gave affirmative responses.

In Cambodia the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Two in three young Cambodians agreed with the statement. In China the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. About three in five young Chinese gave affirmative responses. In Vietnam the youth were no different from older age cohorts. Almost two in three young Vietnamese agreed with the statement.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than older age cohorts, especially their senior citizens. This pattern was found in two democracies (Japan and South Korea) and four non-democracies (China, Cambodia, and Malaysia as well as Singapore to some extent). Second, the youth were less critical than older age cohorts, especially their senior citizens. This pattern was found in one electoral democracy (Indonesia). Lastly, the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. This pattern was found in four democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and one autocracy (Vietnam).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. In three of twelve sample countries (Japan, South Korea and Singapore) only a minority (42-44%) gave affirmative responses. By contrast, in six of them (Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia) more than a two-thirds majority (68-83%) gave favorable responses.

These findings suggest that in a few countries such as Japan and South Korea as well as Singapore and China the youth could be a potential source of change for more freedom of speech. By contrast, in many East Asian countries, democratic or non-democratic, more freedom of speech may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 1 about here)

Table 2 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the highly educated and the affluent were less favorable than the less educated and the poor. In South Korea rural residents were less favorable than urban residents. In Taiwan the poor were less favorable than the affluent. Moreover, the less educated were somewhat less favorable than the highly educated.

In Indonesia none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences, although the poor seemed somewhat less favorable than the affluent. In Mongolia the youth's perceptions differed with

different life circumstances. The highly educated, urban residents and heavy internet users were less favorable than the less educated, rural residents and light or no internet users. Moreover, women were somewhat less favorable than men. In the Philippines none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences although heavy internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than light or no internet users. In Thailand men were less favorable than men. Moreover, light or no internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than heavy internet users.

In Malaysia urban residents were less favorable than rural residents. In Singapore the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances. Urban residents, the affluent, the highly educated and women were less favorable than rural residents, the poor, the less educated and men.

In Cambodia none of different life circumstances resulted in notable differences, although the less educated and the affluent seemed somewhat less favorable than the highly educated and the poor. In China the youth's perceptions varied with different life circumstances. Urban residents, the highly educated and heavy internet users were less favorable than rural residents, the less educated and light or no internet users. In Vietnam none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences.

(Table 2 about here)

Overall, in most sample countries the youth were found to share their views regardless of different social experiences. The possible exceptions were Mongolia, Singapore and China where their youth's perceptions differed with different life circumstances. It was also found that perceptions of freedom of speech among the youth across East Asia varied more often with levels of education.

### ***Freedom of association***

The ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "People can join any organization they like without fear." Responses of "strongly agree" or "agree" indicate favorable evaluation of freedom of association. Table 3 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan and South Korea the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Only less than one in two young Japanese and about three in five young South Koreans agreed with the statement. Unlike their counterparts in Japan and South Korea, however, the Taiwanese youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. About four in five young Taiwanese agreed with the statement.

In Indonesia the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Four in five young Indonesia gave affirmative responses. In Mongolia and Thailand the youth were no different from older age cohorts. Three in four young Mongolians and four in five young Thais agreed with the statement. In

the Philippines the youth were somewhat more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. As in Thailand, four in five young Filipinos gave affirmative responses.

In Malaysia the youth were somewhat less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. More than four in five young Malaysians agreed with the statement. In Singapore the youth were distinguishable from the elderly in their low levels of approval. Less than one in two young Singaporeans gave affirmative responses.

In Cambodia and Vietnam the youth were not much different from older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among the youth was quite different. About nine in ten young Cambodians agreed with the statement whereas only one in two Vietnamese did. In China the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Only two in five young Chinese gave affirmative responses.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than older age cohorts, especially the elderly. This pattern was found in two democracies (Japan and South Korea) and three non-democracies (China, Singapore and to some extent Malaysia). Second, the youth were less critical than the elderly. This pattern was found in two new democracies (Indonesia and to some extent the Philippines). Lastly, there was not much disagreement between the youth and older age cohorts. This pattern was found in five countries, democratic (Taiwan, Mongolia, and Thailand) and autocracies (Cambodia and Vietnam).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. In four of twelve sample countries (Japan, Singapore, China and Vietnam) only less than half (41-49%) gave affirmative responses. By contrast, in seven of them (Taiwan, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia) more than a two-thirds majority (75-88%) gave favorable responses.

These findings suggest that only in a few East Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore and China the youth remains a major group unhappy with the quality of freedom of association. By contrast, in many East Asian countries, democratic or non-democratic, more freedom of association may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 3 about here)

Table 4 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the young in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan rural residents were less favorable than urban residents. Moreover, the highly educated and men seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated and women. In South Korea urban residents and light or no internet users were less favorable than rural residents and heavy internet users. In Taiwan the less educated and the poor were less favorable than the highly educated and the

affluent.

In Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences. Yet, in Indonesia and Mongolia the poor seemed somewhat less favorable than the affluent; in the Philippines heavy internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than light or no internet users; and in Thailand men seemed somewhat less favorable than women.

In Malaysia urban residents were less favorable than rural residents. In Singapore the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances: the highly educated, rural residents and women were less favorable than the less educated, urban residents and men.

In Cambodia urban residents were less favorable than rural residents. As in Singapore, in China the youth's evaluation varied more often with different life circumstances: the highly educated, urban residents and heavy internet users were less favorable than the less educated, rural residents and light or no internet users. In Vietnam light or no internet users were less favorable than heavy users. Moreover, men and the affluent seemed somewhat less favorable than women and the poor.

(Table 4 about here)

Overall, in most East Asian new democracies the youth were found to share their views regardless of different life circumstances or social experiences. By contrast, only in a few non-democracies such as Singapore and China the youth's perceptions differed with different life circumstances. It was also discovered that perceptions of freedom of association among the youth across East Asia varied more often with where they lived.

### **Accountability**

There are two types of accountability, vertical and horizontal. Vertical accountability concerns the extent to which voters hold government leaders accountable for their decision. This type of accountability runs from citizens to government leaders. Horizontal accountability pertains to the extent to which branches of government exercise control over each other. In this analysis we focus on vertical accountability. We first examine the extent to which citizens are able to select and change their government and then whether elections are effective in holding government leaders accountable.

### ***Popular control***

The ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "People have the power to change a government they don't like." Responses of "strongly agree" or "agree" indicate favorable evaluation of popular control of government. It should be noted, however, that they reflect more

than electoral control. They may also include non-electoral control of government. Table 5 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan the youth were somewhat less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Just one in two young Japanese agreed with the statement. In South Korea the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. As in Japan, just one in two young South Koreans gave affirmative responses. Unlike their counterparts in Japan and South Korea, the Taiwanese youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Three in five young Taiwanese agreed with the statement.

In Indonesia the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Seven in ten young Indonesians agreed with the statement. In Mongolia and the Philippines the youth were not different from older age cohorts. In both countries three in four young people gave affirmative responses. In Thailand the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. As in Mongolia and the Philippines, three in four young Thais gave affirmative responses.

In Malaysia the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. As in most electoral democracies, three in four young Malaysians agreed with the statement. By contrast, in Singapore the youth were more, not less, favorable than older age cohorts. Yet, less than one in two young Singaporeans gave affirmative responses.

In Cambodia the youth were no different from older age cohorts. Four in five young Cambodians gave affirmative responses. In Vietnam the youth were no different from the elderly, but somewhat less favorable than adults. Only one in four young Vietnamese gave favorable responses.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were less critical than the elderly, if not than adults. This pattern was found in three democracies (Taiwan, Indonesia and Thailand) and one electoral autocracy (Singapore). In these countries, the younger generation appeared to have more confidence in people power than the older generation. Second, the youth were more critical than the elderly or adults. This pattern was found in the oldest democracy in East Asia (Japan) and one autocracy (Vietnam). Lastly, the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. This pattern was found in three new democracies (South Korea, Mongolia, and the Philippines) and two non-democracies (Malaysia and Cambodia).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. Only in two of twelve sample countries (Singapore and Vietnam) only less than half (47% for Singapore and 27% for Vietnam) gave affirmative responses. By contrast, in six of them (Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia) more than a two-thirds majority (70-82%) gave favorable responses.



These findings suggest that perhaps only in Singapore the youth could be a major source of change for better popular control. By contrast, in electoral democracies such as Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand, popular control of government may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 5 about here)

Table 6 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the youth from poor families were less favorable than those from affluent families. In South Korea urban residents and light or no internet users were less favorable than rural residents and heavy internet users. In Taiwan none of life circumstances brought about notable differences.

In Indonesia women and the poor were less favorable than men and the affluent. In Mongolia urban residents were less favorable than rural residents. Moreover, heavy internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than light or no internet users. As in Taiwan, in the Philippines none of life circumstances resulted in notable differences. In Thailand men were less favorable than women.

In Malaysia the youth's perceptions differed more often with their different life circumstances: women, the less educated and light or no internet users were less favorable than men, the highly educated and heavy internet users. In Singapore rural residents were less favorable than urban residents although a tiny sample size of the former rendered the analysis unreliable.

In Cambodia the youth using internet daily were less favorable than those using it less often. In Vietnam the youth's evaluation varied more often with their different life circumstances. Light or no internet users and the poor were less favorable than heavy internet users and the affluent. Moreover, rural residents and the less educated seemed somewhat less favorable than urban residents and the highly educated.

(Table 6 about here)

Overall, in most sample countries the youth were found to share their views regardless of their different life circumstances or social experiences. The possible exception was Vietnam where the youth differed in their views with their different life circumstances. It was also found that the evaluation of popular control among the youth across East Asia differed more often with the extent to which they were exposed to information technology.

### ***Electoral accountability***

The ABS asked respondents how much they felt that having elections made the government pay attention to what the people thought. Responses of "a great deal" or "quite a lot" indicate favorable

evaluation of electoral accountability. Table 7 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Just two in five young Japanese gave affirmative responses. Unlike their counterparts in Japan, the South Korean youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. More than one in two young South Koreans gave positive responses. In Taiwan the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. About seven in ten young Taiwanese gave affirmative responses.

In Indonesia the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. About one in two young Indonesians gave affirmative responses. By contrast, in Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand the youth were no different from older age cohorts. In these new democracies a majority (56-68%) of their young people approved of electoral accountability.

In Malaysia the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. Two in three young Malaysians gave affirmative responses. In Singapore the youth seemed somewhat less favorable from the elderly but more favorable than adults. Two in three young Singaporeans approved of electoral accountability.

In Cambodia, China and Vietnam the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. In these autocracies a large majority (64-73%) of the youth gave affirmative responses.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than the older generation. This pattern was found in one democracy (Japan) and one electoral autocracy (Singapore). Second, the youth were less critical than the older generation. This pattern was found in two new democracies (Taiwan and Indonesia). Lastly, the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. This pattern was found in four new democracies (South Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand) as well as four non-democracies (Malaysia, Cambodia, China, and Vietnam).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. Japan was the only country where less than half (40%) gave affirmative responses. In six of twelve countries more than a two-thirds majority (66-73%) approved of electoral accountability. They include two new democracies (Taiwan, and the Philippines) and four non-democracies (Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and China).

These findings suggest that perhaps only in Japan the youth could be a major source of change for better electoral accountability. By contrast, in most democracies as well as all non-democracies electoral accountability may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 7 about here)

Table 8 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the youth's evaluation differed more often with different life circumstances: rural residents, the less educated and light or no internet users were less favorable than urban residents, the highly educated and heavy internet users. In South Korea the affluent were less favorable than the poor. Moreover, light or no internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than heavy users. In Taiwan the less educated and the poor were less favorable than the highly educated and the affluent. Moreover, rural residents were somewhat less favorable than urban residents.

In Indonesia the poor were less favorable than the affluent. Moreover, the highly educated seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated. In Mongolia the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances: urban residents, the highly educated and women were less favorable than rural residents, the less educated and men. In the Philippines the poor were less favorable than the affluent. In Thailand urban residents and the less educated were less favorable than rural residents and the highly educated.

In Malaysia the poor and heavy internet users were less favorable than the affluent and light or no internet users. In Singapore urban residents and the poor were less favorable than rural residents and the affluent.

In Cambodia women were less favorable than men. In China women and urban residents were less favorable than men and rural residents. In Vietnam the less educated and light or no internet users were less favorable than the highly educated and heavy internet users.

(Table 8 about here)

Overall, in democracies such as Japan, Mongolia and Taiwan the youth were found to differ in their views with their different life circumstances. By contrast, in most non-democracies the youth tended to share their views regardless of their different life circumstances. It was also found that the evaluation of electoral accountability among the youth across East Asia reflected more often a rural-urban divide and social class differences.

### **Rule of Law**

The rule of law emphasizes that every citizen is subject to the rules of society. It implies that no one is not above the law and that authorities within the state should be bound by the law. In this analysis we focus on the extent to which public officials are in compliance with the law and the extent to which government leaders abuse their public power or office for private gains.

### *Official law-abidingness*

The ABS asked respondents how often they thought government leaders broke the law or abused their power. Responses of “rarely” and “sometimes” indicate favorable evaluation of the rule of law. Table 9 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Only less than one in two young Japanese gave affirmative responses. In South Korea the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Only one in four young South Koreans gave affirmative responses. In Taiwan the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Only three in ten young Taiwanese gave positive responses.

In Indonesia and the Philippines the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. In these new democracies only three in ten young people gave affirmative responses. In Mongolia the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Only less than one in five young Mongolians gave favorable responses. Unlike any other democracies, in Thailand the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. About three in five young Thais gave positive responses.

In Malaysia the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Just two in five young Malaysians gave affirmative responses. In Singapore the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Nonetheless, more than four in five young Singaporeans gave favorable responses.

In Cambodia, China and Vietnam the youth were not much distinguishable from older age cohorts. Yet, their youth’s level of approval differed greatly. More than three in four young Cambodians gave affirmative responses. By contrast, only three in ten young Chinese and less than two in five young Vietnamese gave positive responses.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than especially the elderly. This pattern was found in four democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) and two non-democracies (Malaysia and Singapore). Second, the youth were less critical than the elderly. This pattern was found in one new democracy (Thailand). Lastly, the youth were not in much disagreement with adults or senior citizens. This pattern was found in two new democracies (Indonesia and the Philippines) and three autocracies (Cambodia, China and Vietnam).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. Of twelve sample countries Singapore and Cambodia were the only countries where more than a two-thirds majority (84% for Singapore and 77% for Cambodia) gave favorable responses. In other democratic or non-democratic countries except for Thailand, only less than half (from a low of 15% in Mongolia to a high of 46% in Japan) gave affirmative responses.

These findings suggest that in four democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) and one electoral autocracy (Malaysia) the youth could be a major source of change for better official law-abidingness. By contrast, in Singapore and Cambodia official law-abidingness may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 9 about here)

Table 10 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the youth from affluent families were less favorable than those from poor families. In South Korea none of different life situations brought about notable differences. In Taiwan the youth's evaluation varied more often with different life circumstances: the poor, rural residents and women were less favorable than the affluent, urban residents and men.

In Indonesia those using internet daily were less favorable than those using it less often. In Mongolia none of life circumstances brought about notable differences. In the Philippines and Thailand their youth's perceptions differed more often with different life circumstances. In both electoral democracies urban residents and heavy internet users were somewhat less favorable than rural residents and light or no internet users. Moreover, in the Philippines the highly educated were less favorable than the less educated while in Thailand men were less favorable than women.

In Malaysia urban residents and the poor were somewhat less favorable than rural residents and the affluent. In Singapore urban residents were less favorable than rural residents although the latter's tiny sample size rendered the analysis unreliable. Moreover, men seemed somewhat less favorable than women.

In Cambodia the youth's evaluation differed more often with different life circumstances. Heavy internet users and the poor were less favorable than light or no internet users and the affluent. Moreover, the highly educated seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated. In China rural residents were less favorable than urban residents. In Vietnam heavy internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than light or no internet users.

(Table 10 about here)

Overall, in a few countries (Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia) their youth's perceptions were found to differ with different life circumstances. By contrast, in many countries, democratic or non-democratic, the youth tended to share their views regardless of different life circumstances. It was also found that the evaluation of official law-abidingness among the youth across East Asia differed most frequently with where they lived. Noteworthy is that in many non-democracies exposure to information

technology lowered the level of approval among the youth.

### ***Control of Corruption***

The extent of government corruption can be ascertained not only at the national but also at the local level. For this analysis we focus on the national level. The ABS asked respondents how widespread they thought corruption and bribe-taking were in the national government. Responses of “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt” indicate favorable evaluation of corruption control. Table 11 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among the youth ranged from a low of 23 percent in Taiwan to a high of 56 percent in Japan. In Korea only one in three young people gave affirmative responses.

In Indonesia and Thailand the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among youth differed: only one in three young Indonesians gave affirmative responses whereas more than one in two young Thais did. In Mongolia the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Only one in ten young Mongolians gave favorable responses. In the Philippines the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults: one in three young Filipinos gave favorable responses.

In Malaysia the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. Three in five young Malaysians gave affirmative responses. In Singapore the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Less than nine in ten young Singaporeans gave favorable responses.

As in Singapore, in Cambodia the youth were more favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Yet, their level of approval was far lower than that of the Singaporean youth: less than one in two young Cambodians gave favorable responses. In China the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts: about one in two young Chinese gave affirmative responses.

Overall, three patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than older age cohorts. This pattern was found in four democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia). Second, the youth were less critical than the older generation. This pattern was found in one new democracy (the Philippines) and two non-democracies (Singapore and Cambodia). Lastly, the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. This pattern was found in two new democracies (Indonesia and Thailand) and two non-democracies (Malaysia and China).

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. Of twelve sample countries Singapore was the only country where more than a two-thirds majority (86%) gave

affirmative responses. In six of them only less than half (11-47%) gave favorable responses. They included five democracies (South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines) and one autocracy (Cambodia).

These findings suggest that in four democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) and one electoral autocracy (Malaysia) the youth could be a major source of change for better control of corruption. By contrast, in Singapore government corruption is hardly a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 11 about here)

Table 12 shows the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the less educated and light or no internet users were less favorable than the highly educated and heavy internet users. In South Korea the youth's evaluation varied more often with different life circumstances: rural residents, the poor and light or no internet users were less favorable than urban residents, the affluent and heavy internet users. In Taiwan the poor and women were less favorable than the affluent and men.

In Indonesia none of life circumstances brought about notable differences. In Mongolia the poor seemed somewhat less favorable than the affluent. In the Philippines the youth's perceptions differed more often with different life circumstances. The highly educated and heavy internet users were less favorable than the less educated and light or internet users. Moreover, men and urban residents seemed somewhat less favorable than women and rural residents. In Thailand men and heavy internet users seemed somewhat less favorable than women and light or no internet users.

In Malaysia the highly educated seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated. In Singapore different life circumstances brought about notable differences: the poor and heavy internet users were less favorable than the affluent and light or no users. Although a tiny sample size of rural residents rendered the analysis unreliable, urban residents were less favorable than rural residents.

In Cambodia the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances. The highly educated and heavy internet users were less favorable than the less educated and light or no internet users. Moreover, the poor seemed somewhat less favorable than the affluent. In China women and urban residents were less favorable than men and rural residents.

(Table 12 about here)

Overall, in a few countries (South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Cambodia) the youth's perceptions of corruption control were found to differ with different life circumstances. In particular, the

Filipino youth had little agreement among themselves. By contrast, in many countries, democratic or non-democratic, the youth tended to share their views. In particular, in Indonesia, Mongolia and Malaysia the youth had little disagreement among themselves. It was also found that the evaluation of corruption control among the youth across East Asia differed more often with exposure to information technology and the level of family income.

### **Responsiveness**

Responsiveness refers to governmental responsiveness to citizen demands, needs and expectations. It may be measured directly by asking citizens to what extent they think government is responsive to their demands and needs. Citizen demands and needs are diverse and change over time. Nonetheless, basic necessities such as food, shelter and clothing are the basic needs people everywhere care most. Hence, responsiveness may be indirectly measured by the extent to which people's basic needs are met.

#### ***Governmental responsiveness***

The ABS asked respondents how well they thought the government responded to what people thought. Responses of "very responsive" or "largely responsive" indicate favorable evaluation of governmental responsiveness. Table 13 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan and South Korea the youth was less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. In these liberal democracies even the level of approval among the youth was similar: about one in four young people gave affirmative responses. Unlike their counterparts in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, the Taiwan youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. About two in five young Taiwanese gave favorable responses.

In Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. In these new democracies about two in five young people gave favorable responses. By contrast, in Mongolia the youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Only one in ten young Mongolians gave affirmative responses.

In Malaysia the youth were no different than older age cohorts. About two in three young Malaysians gave affirmative responses. Unlike their counterparts in Malaysia, the Singaporean youth were less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Yet, their level of approval was similar: about two in three young Singaporeans gave affirmative responses.

In Cambodia, Vietnam and China the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among the youth differed: in Cambodia one in two gave affirmative responses whereas in Vietnam and China three in four did.



Overall, two patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were more critical than the elderly, if not than adults. This pattern was found in three democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia) and one electoral autocracy (Singapore). Second, the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts, including the elderly. This pattern was evidently found in three new democracies (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) and two autocracies (Cambodia and Vietnam).

It was also found that in two of twelve sample countries (China and Vietnam) more than a two-thirds majority (74-76%) gave affirmative responses. The level of approval among the youth in two electoral autocracies (Malaysia and Singapore) was close to a two-thirds majority (64-65%). By contrast, in all seven democracies, liberal or electoral, only less than half (9-42%) gave affirmative responses.

These findings suggest that in three democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia) the youth could be a major source of change for better governmental responsiveness. In Vietnam and China, however, more governmental responsiveness may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 13 about here)

Table 14 presents the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan the youth from poor families seemed somewhat less favorable than those from affluent families. In South Korea the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances. Women, the poor families and light or no internet users were less favorable than men, the affluent and heavy internet users. Moreover, rural residents seemed somewhat less favorable than urban residents. In Taiwan men and rural residents were less favorable than women and urban residents.

In Indonesia and Mongolia none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences. In the Philippines urban residents and heavy internet users were less favorable than rural residents and light or no internet users. In Thailand more life circumstances resulted in notable differences. Heavy internet users and the highly educated were less favorable than light or users and the less educated. Moreover, urban residents seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated.

In Malaysia urban residents and heavy internet users were less favorable than rural residents and light or no internet users. In Singapore the youth's evaluation differed with different life circumstances. The poor, men and heavy internet users were less favorable than the affluent, women and light or no internet users. Urban residents were less favorable than rural residents although the latter's tiny sample size rendered the analysis unreliable.

In Cambodia, China and Vietnam none of life circumstances brought about notable differences. In these autocracies the youth tended to share their views of governmental responsiveness regardless of their

different life circumstances.

(Table 14 about here)

Overall, only in a few countries (South Korea, Thailand and Singapore) the youth's perceptions of governmental responsiveness differed more often with different life circumstances. In particular, in South Korea and Singapore the youth had little agreement among themselves. By contrast, in most sample countries, democratic or non-democratic, the youth tended to share their views. In particular, in two electoral democracies (Indonesia and Mongolia) and three autocracies (Cambodia, China and Vietnam) the youth had no disagreement among themselves. It was also found that the evaluation of governmental responsiveness among the youth across East Asia reflected more often a rural-urban divide as well as a digital divide.

### ***Basic welfare provision***

The ABS asked respondents whether they agree with the statement "People have basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter." Responses of "strongly agree" or "agree" indicate favorable evaluation of basic welfare provision. Table 14 shows the national distribution of the evaluation across age cohorts.

In Japan the youth were somewhat less favorable than the elderly, if not than adults. Nonetheless, two in three young Japanese gave affirmative responses. In South Korea the youth were not distinguishable from older age cohorts. About two in five young South Koreans made favorable evaluation. Unlike their counterparts in South Korea, however, the Taiwan youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. About one in two young Taiwanese gave affirmative responses.

In all electoral democracies (Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand) the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. Yet, the level of approval among the youth varied from one country to another. In Thailand more than nine in ten approved of basic welfare provision. In Indonesia and the Philippines about three in four made favorable evaluation. In Mongolia, however, only one in four gave affirmative responses.

In Malaysia and Singapore the youth were not quite distinguishable from older age cohorts. In both electoral autocracies about nine in ten young people approved of basic welfare provision.

In Cambodia and Vietnam the youth were no more different from older age cohorts. Nearly nine in ten young Cambodians and three in four young Vietnamese gave favorable responses. In China, however, the youth were less favorable than older age cohorts. Nonetheless, as in Vietnam, three in four young Chinese approved of basic welfare provision.

Overall, two patterns of responses were found among the youth across East Asia. First, the youth were

more critical than older age cohorts, especially the elderly. This pattern was found in two democracies (Japan and Taiwan) and one autocracy (China). Noteworthy is that despite their different regime types, the Chinese and Taiwanese youth were less favorable than their older generations, although the Chinese youth were far more favorable than the Taiwanese youth. Second, the youth were not much distinguishable from older age cohorts. This pattern was found in most sample countries, democratic or non-democratic.

It was also found that the level of approval among the youth varied from country to country. South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia were the only countries where less than half (26-48%) gave favorable responses. In all other sample countries except for Japan more than a two-thirds majority (74-92%) approved of basic welfare provision. Even in Japan the youth's level of approval (64%) was close to a two-thirds majority.

These findings suggest that in Taiwan the youth could be a major source of change for better basic welfare provision. In all the other countries, democratic or non-democratic, except for South Korea and Mongolia, however, more basic welfare provision may not be a rallying point for the youth's pro-democracy protests.

(Table 15 about here)

Table 15 presents the national distribution of the evaluation among the youth in terms of different life circumstances. In Japan rural residents and women were less favorable than urban residents and men. In South Korea the youth's evaluation varied more often with different life circumstances. Heavy internet users and the highly educated were less favorable than light or no internet users and the less educated. Moreover, rural residents seemed somewhat less favorable than urban residents. In Taiwan urban residents and the highly educated were less favorable than rural residents and the less educated.

As in Taiwan, in Indonesia urban residents and the highly educated were less favorable than rural residents and the less educated. In Mongolia heavy internet users were less favorable than light or no internet users. Moreover, the highly educated seemed somewhat less favorable than the less educated. In the Philippines women seemed somewhat less favorable than men. In Thailand none of life circumstances brought about notable differences.

In Malaysia and Singapore the youth's evaluation did not vary much with different life circumstances. Yet, in Malaysia women seemed somewhat less favorable than men whereas in Singapore rural residents seemed somewhat less favorable than urban residents.

In Cambodia heavy internet users were less favorable than light or no internet users. In China the youth's evaluation differed more often with different life circumstances. Urban residents, heavy internet

users and the highly educated were less favorable than rural residents, light or no internet users and the less educated. In Vietnam none of different life circumstances brought about notable differences.

(Table 16 about here)

Overall, only in a few countries (South Korea and China) the youth's perceptions of basic welfare provision differed more often with different life circumstances associated with education, place of residence and internet use. By contrast, in many sample countries, democratic or non-democratic, the youth tended to share their views regardless of different individual life situations. In particular, in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and Vietnam the youth had little disagreement among themselves. It was also found that the evaluation of basic welfare provision among the youth across East Asia reflected most often a rural-urban divide. Noteworthy is that life circumstances associated with family income brought no differences across East Asia.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

There could be three patterns of responses across age cohorts. First, there is no notable difference between the youth and older age cohorts. Second, the youth were distinguishable from older age cohorts in their higher levels of approval. Lastly, the youth were distinguishable from older age cohorts in their lower levels of approval. The analysis shows that in most dimensions of democratic governance examined here three patterns were found across East Asia.

In the evaluation of freedom of speech the third pattern was found more evidently in democracies (Japan and South Korea) and non-democracies (China, Cambodia and Malaysia). The second pattern was found most notably in a new democracy (Indonesia). The first pattern was found most evidently in most new democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand).

In the evaluation of freedom of association the third pattern was found more evidently in democracies (Japan and South Korea) and non-democracies (China and Singapore). The second pattern was again found most notably in a new democracy (Indonesia). The first pattern was found in new democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia and Thailand) and non-democracies (Cambodia and Vietnam).

In the evaluation of popular control there was no evident example of the third pattern. The second pattern was found more notably in new democracies (Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand) and a non-democracy (Singapore). The first pattern was found more evidently in new democracies (Mongolia and the Philippines) and non-democracies (Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam).

In the evaluation of electoral accountability the third pattern was found most notably in Japan, the oldest democracy in East Asia. The second pattern was found more evidently in new democracies

(Indonesia and Taiwan). The first pattern was found in most new democracies (South Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand) and non-democracies (Cambodia, China and Vietnam).

In the evaluation of official law-abidingness the third pattern was found more evidently in democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) and non-democracies (Malaysia and Singapore). The second pattern was found in a new democracy (Thailand). The first pattern was found most notably in a new democracy (Indonesia) and a non-democracy (Vietnam).

In the evaluation of control of corruption the third pattern was found most evidently in democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia). The second pattern was found in democratic (the Philippines) and non-democratic (Singapore and Cambodia) countries. The first pattern was found most notably in non-democracies (Malaysia and China).

In the evaluation of governmental responsiveness the third pattern was found in democracies (Japan, South Korea and Mongolia) and a non-democracy (Singapore). There was no evident case of the second pattern. The first pattern was found most notably in new democracies (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) and non-democracies (Cambodia and Vietnam).

In the evaluation of basic welfare provision the third pattern was found most evidently in Taiwan and China. There was no evident case of the second pattern. The first pattern was found in democratic (South Korea, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines) and non-democratic (Singapore, Cambodia and Vietnam) countries.

Since the third pattern indicates the existence of the youth whose discontent is greater than that of the older generation, the number of such pattern across the dimensions of democratic governance may suggest the extent of generational conflict in a country. In view of the number of the third pattern, Japan (6), South Korea (5) and Singapore (4) appear to experience greater generational conflict. By contrast, with no such pattern Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam seem to experience little generational conflict.

Are the youth a potential source of change for better governance in East Asia? When more than a two-thirds majority of the youth approved of institutional performance, they are unlikely to be a source of change for better governance. When less than half of the youth approved of institutional performance, they could be a potential source of change. Moreover, when they are more critical than the older generation, the youth are more likely to be a major source of change for better governance.

Are the youth a potential source of change for more freedom? First, in Japan and South Korea as well as Singapore and China the youth could be a major source of change for more freedom of speech. In other

East Asian countries including non-democratic ones, the youth may not be a potential source of such change. Second, in Japan as well as Singapore and China the youth could be a major source of change for more freedom of association. In other East Asian countries including non-democratic ones, the youth may not be a potential source of such change.

Are the youth a potential source of change for better accountability? First, perhaps only in Singapore the youth could be a major source of change for better popular control. By contrast, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand, the youth may not be a source of such change. Second, perhaps only in Japan the youth could be a major source of change for better electoral accountability. By contrast, in most East Asian countries including non-democratic ones the youth may not be a potential source of such change.

Are the youth a potential source of change for better rule of law? First, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia as well as Malaysia the youth could be a major source of change for better official law-abidingness. By contrast, in Singapore and Cambodia the youth may not be a source of such change. Second, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia as well as Malaysia the youth could be a major source of change for better control of corruption. By contrast, in Singapore the youth may not be a source of such change.

Are the youth a potential source of change for better responsiveness? First, in Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia the youth could be a major source of change for better governmental responsiveness. In Vietnam and China, however, the youth may not be a source of such change. Second, in Taiwan the youth could be a major source of change for better basic welfare provision of basic welfare. By contrast, in all the other countries, democratic or non-democratic, except for South Korea and Mongolia, the youth may not be a source of such change. The potential role of the youth in bringing about better quality of democratic governance appears to vary greatly across East Asia.

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**Table 1 Evaluation of freedom of speech**

	People are free to speak what they think without fear		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<b><i>Liberal democracy</i></b>			
Japan	44	53	65
South Korea	42	54	64
Taiwan	71	75	76
<b><i>Electoral democracy</i></b>			
Indonesia	83	82	62
Mongolia	56	59	60
Philippines	78	74	77
Thailand	83	85	78
<b><i>Electoral autocracy</i></b>			
Malaysia	78	80	88
Singapore	42	51	50
<b><i>Autocracy</i></b>			
Cambodia	68	67	81
China	58	71	78
Vietnam	63	66	67

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.



**Table 2 Evaluation of freedom of speech among the youth**

	People are free to speak what they think without fear											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	45	43	72	83	51	76	74	80	48	66	57	60
Female	43	40	69	82	60	80	91	76	38	70	59	66
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	51	37	65	83	62	80	83	79	52	68	63	63
Some college+	35	43	74	81	50	75	83	75	36	76	46	64
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	42	30	69	83	66	77	84	80	100	68	63	63
Urban	49	42	73	82	52	78	81	65	41	70	39	61
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	62	41	60	76	59	76	81	76	56	74	62	62
Cover needs	41	42	72	88	54	80	85	78	39	66	57	62
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	40	41	76	84	61	79	80	80	37	68	65	62
Heavy	47	42	70	79	46	71	89	76	44	69	50	67

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 3 Evaluation of freedom of association**

	People can join any organization they like without fear		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<i>Liberal democracy</i>			
Japan	47	61	73
South Korea	58	68	71
Taiwan	79	79	76
<i>Electoral democracy</i>			
Indonesia	81	81	62
Mongolia	75	76	77
Philippines	80	73	71
Thailand	80	85	75
<i>Electoral autocracy</i>			
Malaysia	82	81	90
Singapore	46	53	59
<i>Autocracy</i>			
Cambodia	88	82	88
China	41	54	62
Vietnam	49	51	54

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 4 Evaluation of freedom of association among the youth**

	People can join any organization they like without fear											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	43	60	78	82	75	80	75	86	53	88	38	44
Female	51	54	81	80	76	82	84	79	40	87	43	53
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	51	54	71	81	76	79	81	82	61	88	45	48
Some college+	42	58	83	81	75	83	79	83	36	85	29	48
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	39	70	77	83	73	85	82	85	33	89	44	63
Urban	63	57	80	82	77	79	75	65	46	79	27	61
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	43	55	70	76	72	77	81	81	44	88	43	54
Cover needs	46	61	80	84	81	82	83	83	46	87	39	46
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	46	46	73	81	76	81	81	83	47	88	47	45
Heavy	48	59	80	81	75	73	79	81	45	81	33	62

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 5 Evaluation of popular control**

	People have the power to change a government they don't like		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<i>Liberal democracy</i>			
Japan	50	57	59
South Korea	50	53	44
Taiwan	61	58	45
<i>Electoral democracy</i>			
Indonesia	70	64	48
Mongolia	77	75	75
Philippines	76	81	79
Thailand	77	75	65
<i>Electoral autocracy</i>			
Malaysia	77	80	80
Singapore	47	35	26
<i>Autocracy</i>			
Cambodia	82	83	84
China	-	-	-
Vietnam	27	36	31

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 6 Evaluation of popular control among the youth**

	People have the power to change a government they don't like											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	49	52	59	78	78	77	67	83	50	82	-	23
Female	50	48	64	63	77	76	85	70	45	81	-	29
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	48	46	57	70	81	75	79	73	47	81	-	25
Some college+	52	51	63	71	74	80	72	89	47	85	-	34
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	50	80	62	70	88	73	76	75	17	82	-	28
Urban	49	48	60	68	73	77	78	88	48	79	-	20
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	38	51	63	64	78	74	78	76	44	84	-	36
Cover needs	52	48	61	74	75	79	78	77	48	80	-	22
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	50	41	60	70	80	76	78	73	47	82	-	23
Heavy	50	51	61	70	72	80	75	82	47	69	-	39

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 7 Evaluation of electoral accountability**

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How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay  
attention to what the people think?

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	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<b><i>Liberal democracy</i></b>			
Japan	40	50	61
South Korea	54	50	54
Taiwan	70	77	57
<b><i>Electoral democracy</i></b>			
Indonesia	51	54	38
Mongolia	58	54	55
Philippines	68	68	65
Thailand	56	56	51
<b><i>Electoral autocracy</i></b>			
Malaysia	66	68	71
Singapore	67	59	76
<b><i>Autocracy</i></b>			
Cambodia	73	75	72
China	70	67	68
Vietnam	64	69	62

---

Entries are the percent saying “a great deal” or “quite a lot.”

**Table 8 Evaluation of electoral accountability among the youth**

	How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	44	53	69	52	64	67	55	67	64	81	76	68
Female	37	55	71	50	54	69	58	64	69	66	64	62
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	35	54	59	52	66	66	53	65	65	73	71	62
Some college+	48	53	76	44	50	73	63	68	67	70	66	78
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	33	60	65	52	72	65	60	66	100	72	72	63
Urban	55	53	74	48	52	69	49	65	66	78	62	65
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	43	62	60	45	56	63	60	59	59	69	70	61
Cover needs	39	49	72	55	61	74	58	69	71	76	71	65
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	32	46	76	51	59	68	55	71	68	73	70	61
Heavy	45	55	69	49	56	69	59	60	66	75	70	77

Entries are the percent saying “a great deal” or “quite a lot.”

**Table 9 Evaluation of control of corruption**

---

How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?

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	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<b><i>Liberal democracy</i></b>			
Japan	56	72	85
South Korea	34	43	54
Taiwan	23	35	34
<b><i>Electoral democracy</i></b>			
Indonesia	35	38	32
Mongolia	11	19	21
Philippines	35	29	20
Thailand	55	51	48
<b><i>Electoral autocracy</i></b>			
Malaysia	60	60	59
Singapore	86	84	72
<b><i>Autocracy</i></b>			
Cambodia	47	40	31
China	53	49	51
Vietnam	-	-	-

---

Entries are the percent saying “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt.”



**Table 10 Evaluation of control of corruption among the youth**

	How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	57	34	27	34	10	30	50	62	86	48	59	-
Female	54	34	17	35	12	39	59	58	85	46	48	-
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	50	33	21	34	11	39	55	62	81	48	54	-
Some college+	63	34	24	39	11	26	55	53	88	36	51	-
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	58	20	21	34	14	42	53	61	100	47	56	-
Urban	51	35	24	37	10	33	59	56	85	51	44	-
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	57	26	10	35	8	36	57	65	75	42	55	-
Cover needs	57	40	24	35	16	34	54	58	88	50	54	-
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	44	23	24	35	12	36	57	62	78	48	56	-
Heavy	61	35	22	33	8	24	49	58	87	25	50	-

Entries are the percent saying “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt.”

**Table 11 Evaluation of official law-abidingness**

	How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power?		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<b><i>Liberal democracy</i></b>			
Japan	46	54	64
South Korea	25	28	41
Taiwan	29	39	45
<b><i>Electoral democracy</i></b>			
Indonesia	28	33	29
Mongolia	15	21	25
Philippines	31	33	37
Thailand	58	57	48
<b><i>Electoral autocracy</i></b>			
Malaysia	40	51	53
Singapore	84	88	94
<b><i>Autocracy</i></b>			
Cambodia	77	74	70
China	29	24	21
Vietnam	37	35	36

Entries are the percent saying “rarely” or “sometimes.”

**Table 12 Evaluation of official law-abidingness among the youth**

	How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power?											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	43	25	34	31	19	29	48	44	79	78	31	55
Female	49	25	21	26	13	34	66	38	88	77	28	50
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	45	22	28	28	19	34	58	40	83	78	28	53
Some college+	46	26	29	29	12	24	57	41	85	70	33	51
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	47	30	23	29	18	44	61	42	100	78	27	52
Urban	43	25	34	25	14	29	52	33	84	73	40	59
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	62	21	10	32	13	32	54	46	84	71	33	49
Cover needs	43	28	31	26	19	30	61	38	83	81	28	55
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	46	23	27	29	16	32	61	43	84	78	27	55
Heavy	46	25	29	19	14	24	51	38	84	63	33	46

Entries are the percentage of saying “rarely” or “sometimes.”

**Table 13 Evaluation of governmental responsiveness**

	How well do you think the government responds to what people think?		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<i><b>Liberal democracy</b></i>			
Japan	25	28	47
South Korea	28	29	41
Taiwan	42	38	35
<i><b>Electoral democracy</b></i>			
Indonesia	40	43	40
Mongolia	9	15	25
Philippines	41	43	36
Thailand	36	39	41
<i><b>Electoral autocracy</b></i>			
Malaysia	65	67	73
Singapore	64	60	77
<i><b>Autocracy</b></i>			
Cambodia	51	54	52
China	74	78	82
Vietnam	76	79	81

Entries are the percent saying “very responsive” or “largely responsive.”

**Table 14 Evaluation of governmental responsiveness among the youth**

	How well do you think the government responds to what people think?											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	25	32	25	40	12	42	34	67	56	54	77	80
Female	24	21	39	40	7	41	38	64	69	49	72	73
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	23	28	39	40	12	43	41	66	67	52	74	76
Some college+	26	27	44	37	6	38	26	63	61	46	76	80
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	25	20	34	40	12	60	39	67	83	52	75	76
Urban	25	28	49	41	8	38	30	56	63	48	70	74
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	19	22	37	42	7	40	35	63	44	47	74	80
Cover needs	27	32	43	38	12	43	38	67	69	54	76	73
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	20	14	38	39	11	43	44	70	71	51	77	76
Heavy	27	29	43	42	6	33	20	60	62	50	71	73

Entries are the percent saying “very responsive” or “largely responsive.”

**Table 15 Evaluation of basic welfare provision**

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	People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter		
	Youth (< 30)	Adults (30–64)	Seniors (65+)
<i><b>Liberal democracy</b></i>			
Japan	64	68	73
South Korea	39	39	42
Taiwan	48	59	74
<i><b>Electoral democracy</b></i>			
Indonesia	75	78	71
Mongolia	26	27	25
Philippines	76	72	71
Thailand	93	92	86
<i><b>Electoral autocracy</b></i>			
Malaysia	86	89	92
Singapore	92	88	90
<i><b>Autocracy</b></i>			
Cambodia	87	91	84
China	74	83	86
Vietnam	77	82	74

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Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

**Table 16 Evaluation of basic welfare provision among the youth**

	People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter											
	JPN	KOR	TWN	IDN	MNG	PHL	THA	MYS	SGP	KHM	CHN	VNM
<i>Gender</i>												
Male	69	38	46	72	26	81	91	90	92	87	73	81
Female	58	39	51	77	26	72	95	82	93	86	75	74
<i>Education</i>												
Less than college	62	46	58	76	31	78	92	86	91	87	77	78
Some college+	66	36	43	66	22	71	97	86	93	82	65	76
<i>Residence</i>												
Rural	58	30	58	78	27	79	93	86	83	87	78	75
Urban	76	39	40	62	26	76	94	88	92	84	60	81
<i>Family income</i>												
Not cover needs	68	36	53	73	26	77	95	84	91	86	69	74
Cover needs	64	41	48	76	26	76	95	87	94	87	75	80
<i>Internet use</i>												
None or light	60	50	54	77	30	77	92	87	90	87	80	80
Heavy	65	37	47	70	18	71	95	85	93	25	67	77

Entries are the percent agreeing the statement.

